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Abstract:	  	  Sociology	  of	  law	  is	  a	  rich	  and	  multi-­‐faceted	  field	  encompassing	  macro	  and	  
micro	  sociological	  and	  criminological	  concepts	  and	  addressing	  issues	  of	  law	  in	  
society.	  	  This	  paper	  draws	  upon	  the	  law-­‐related	  works	  of	  the	  three	  classical	  
sociological	  thinkers	  –	  the	  “fathers”	  of	  Sociology	  –	  Karl	  Marx,	  Max	  Weber	  and	  Emile	  
Durkheim,	  in	  order	  to	  synthesize	  their	  respective	  sociologies	  of	  law.	  By	  developing	  a	  
thorough	  understanding	  of	  each	  theorist’s	  approach,	  comparing	  and	  contrasting	  the	  
three,	  and	  critically	  appraising	  their	  perspectives,	  this	  paper	  strives	  to	  accomplish	  a	  
more	  well-­‐rounded	  understanding	  of	  the	  field	  of	  Sociology	  of	  Law	  from	  the	  various	  
sociological	  perspectives	  that	  the	  three	  thinkers	  represent.	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Toward	  an	  Understanding	  of	  Law	  from	  the	  Perspective	  of	  Classical	  Sociological	  Theory	  	  
	  
For	  many,	  the	  legal	  system	  and	  the	  laws	  that	  it	  produces	  are	  understood	  as	  a	  
fundamental	  product	  of	  contemporary	  society.	  The	  assumed	  democratic	  nature	  of	  
the	  modern	  Western	  world	  implies	  that	  legal	  discourse	  –	  necessarily	  defined	  by	  and	  
connected	  to	  democracy	  –	  may	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  means	  of	  governing	  people	  in	  an	  
impartial	  and	  fair	  manner.	  Law,	  broadly	  conceived	  under	  this	  understanding,	  ought	  
to	  benefit	  those	  who	  abide	  by	  it,	  while	  punishing	  those	  who	  do	  not.	  Laws	  that	  
intentionally	  seek	  to	  disadvantage	  some	  while	  allocating	  inequitable	  privileges	  to	  
others	  are	  perceived	  as	  unjust,	  and	  this	  bias	  suggests	  that	  these	  particular	  laws	  are	  
not	  a	  reflection	  of	  a	  democratic	  society.	  	  The	  society,	  in	  this	  case	  is	  rather	  either	  non-­‐
democratic	  or	  the	  unjust	  nature	  of	  the	  law	  is	  an	  aberration	  that	  needs	  explanation.	  
Through	  the	  works	  of	  the	  three	  sociological	  “fathers”,	  this	  thesis	  addresses	  the	  
substantive	  question	  of	  how	  law	  is	  being	  generated,	  what	  its	  relationship	  is	  to	  major	  
social	  institutions	  and	  society	  overall,	  how	  it	  is	  being	  implemented	  and	  what	  the	  
consequences	  of	  such	  implementation	  may	  be.	  	  	  
The	  sociology	  of	  law	  is	  the	  study	  of	  law	  in	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	  social	  
system	  within	  which	  law	  is	  located.	  Specifically,	  it	  discusses	  the	  social	  factors	  that	  
shape	  law;	  namely,	  the	  political,	  economic,	  and	  cultural	  interests	  that	  define	  the	  law,	  
as	  we	  know	  it.	  It	  also	  addresses	  the	  social	  effects	  or	  implications	  of	  particular	  laws	  
and	  legal	  systems,	  whether	  intended	  or	  unintended.	  The	  classical	  theoretical	  core	  of	  
	  
2	  
the	  sociology	  of	  law	  is	  constituted	  by	  the	  theories	  of	  the	  three	  founding	  fathers	  of	  
classical	  sociology,	  Karl	  Marx,	  Max	  Weber,	  and	  Emile	  Durkheim.	  These	  three	  
classical	  sociologists	  represent	  different	  theoretical	  and	  epistemological	  approaches	  
in	  sociology	  (conflict,	  interpretive,	  and	  functionalist	  respectively).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  
they	  all	  dealt	  with	  law	  and	  legal	  systems	  in	  their	  research.	  By	  comparing	  and	  
contrasting	  their	  writings	  on	  law,	  we	  come	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  nuances	  of	  their	  
theoretical	  perspectives	  (which	  they	  apply	  in	  conceptualizing	  law),	  their	  differences,	  
complementarities,	  and	  possible	  gaps	  in	  understanding	  law	  in	  society.	  Ultimately,	  
we	  come	  to	  appreciate	  their	  respective	  theories	  at	  work	  in	  the	  study	  of	  a	  particular	  
social	  phenomenon,	  i.e.	  law.	  Restricting	  one’s	  understanding	  of	  this	  vast	  field	  to	  just	  
one	  of	  the	  three	  theorists’	  approach	  may	  be	  problematic,	  as	  doing	  so	  allows	  for	  a	  
narrow	  understanding	  of	  the	  social	  factors	  that	  are	  inherently	  tied	  to	  legal	  
discourse.	  Thus,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  this	  thesis	  strives	  to	  synthesize	  the	  theories	  of	  law	  
of	  the	  three	  classical	  sociologists	  with	  the	  intent	  to	  create	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  
understanding	  of	  law	  in	  society	  than	  any	  of	  the	  three	  approaches	  by	  themselves	  may	  
accomplish.	  	  
	   In	  this	  thesis,	  the	  three	  sociologists’	  approaches	  to	  understanding	  law	  will	  be	  
elaborated	  upon	  through	  an	  in-­‐depth	  explanation	  of	  the	  complex	  theories	  
themselves,	  and	  at	  times	  using	  contemporary	  examples	  of	  law	  in	  society	  to	  
supplement	  each	  sociologist’s	  theoretical	  points.	  Firstly,	  Marx’s	  historical	  
materialist	  approach	  to	  law	  will	  be	  analyzed.	  As	  will	  be	  seen,	  within	  this	  approach	  
three	  distinct	  interpretations	  of	  Marxist	  thought	  (deterministic,	  semi-­‐autonomous,	  
and	  dialectical)	  will	  be	  drawn	  upon,	  each	  producing	  a	  different	  understanding	  of	  the	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relationship	  of	  law	  to	  society’s	  economic	  foundation.	  Secondly,	  the	  Weberian	  
dialectical	  approach	  will	  be	  analyzed.	  Despite	  Weber’s	  intent	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  “life-­‐
long	  struggle	  with	  the	  ghost	  of	  Karl	  Marx”	  (From:	  Cuff,	  E.	  C.,	  W.	  W.	  Sharrock	  and	  
D.	  W.	  Francis,	  Perspectives	  in	  Sociology,	  third	  edition,	  London,	  Routledge,	  
1992,	  p.	  97).	  As	  one	  of	  Weber’s	  scholars	  has	  remarked,	  this	  approach	  shares	  
similarities	  with	  Marx’s	  dialectical	  interpretation.	  Though	  Weber	  is	  considered	  the	  
founder	  of	  the	  interpretive	  school	  of	  sociology,	  his	  conception	  of	  law	  is	  quite	  
positivist	  and	  he	  does	  not	  utilize	  his	  interpretative	  approach	  to	  his	  understanding	  of	  
law.	  	  Nevertheless,	  his	  approach	  to	  law	  is	  dialectical	  as	  the	  term	  refers	  to	  Weber’s	  
understanding	  of	  the	  reciprocal	  relationship	  between	  law	  and	  economy.	  Lastly,	  the	  
Durkheimian	  functionalist	  approach	  will	  be	  discussed.	  Here,	  as	  will	  be	  seen,	  the	  
discussion	  is	  quite	  distinct	  from	  the	  previous	  two	  in	  that	  Durkheim	  looks	  at	  law	  
(and	  crime)	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  function	  in	  society,	  assessed	  empirically	  though	  
abstractly,	  in	  terms	  of	  grand	  generalizations	  of	  different	  types	  of	  society	  possessing	  













	  	  The	  Conflict	  Approach	  and	  the	  Three	  Interpretations	  of	  the	  Law	  -­‐	  Economy	  
Relationship:	  Karl	  Marx’s	  Sociology	  of	  Law	  
	  	  
The	  various	  works	  of	  Karl	  Marx	  and	  Friedrich	  Engels	  discuss	  the	  reality	  of	  
the	  social	  world	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  fundamental	  and	  ongoing	  conflict,	  as	  famously	  
articulated	  in	  The	  Manifesto	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  (1848),	  “The	  history	  of	  all	  
hitherto	  existing	  society	  is	  the	  history	  of	  class	  struggles.”	  (qtd.	  in:	  Calhoun	  et.	  al.	  
2002,	  p.	  156).	  For	  Marx,	  in	  any	  society,	  and	  most	  notably	  in	  the	  modern	  capitalist	  
society,	  a	  population	  divides	  itself	  into	  two	  distinct	  classes	  –	  the	  proletariat	  and	  the	  
bourgeoisie	  –	  which	  are	  distinguished	  from	  one	  another	  by	  their	  contrasting	  
relationships	  to	  the	  means	  of	  production	  of	  a	  society’s	  governing	  economic	  
structure.	  These	  two	  classes	  exist	  in	  a	  state	  of	  continuous	  conflict,	  that	  is,	  an	  ongoing	  
power	  struggle.	  The	  ‘conflict	  approach’	  in	  the	  sociology	  of	  law	  suggests	  that	  the	  
existence	  of	  all	  social	  phenomena	  is	  a	  result	  of	  said	  conflict	  rooted	  in	  a	  fundamental	  
struggle	  for	  economic	  power.	  The	  social	  definition	  and	  implementation	  of	  law	  is	  no	  
exception	  to	  this	  proposition.	  This	  section	  seeks	  to	  provide	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  
sociology	  of	  law	  from	  Marx’s	  conflict	  perspective,	  demonstrating	  the	  fundamental	  
relationship	  between	  socio-­‐economic	  power	  and	  legal	  discourse.	  	  	  
The	  distinction	  between	  haves	  and	  have-­‐nots	  in	  a	  given	  society	  may	  not	  be	  
solely	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  distinction	  between	  those	  possessing	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  
material	  wealth,	  and	  their	  economically	  inferior,	  “…	  The	  class	  which	  is	  the	  ruling	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material	  force	  in	  society	  is	  at	  the	  same	  time	  its	  ruling	  intellectual	  force.”	  (qtd.	  in:	  
Calhoun	  et.	  al.,	  2002,	  p.	  144).	  This	  class,	  claiming	  ownership	  of	  the	  means	  of	  
production	  of	  society	  and	  being	  the	  dominant	  intellectual	  force	  of	  society	  are	  not	  
necessarily	  the	  same	  people,	  however	  intellectuals	  express	  the	  ideas	  and	  interests	  of	  
the	  economic	  elite;	  the	  two	  are	  therefore	  synonymous.	  Indeed,	  with	  immense	  
economic	  and/or	  material	  wealth,	  comes	  substantial	  social	  and	  cultural	  influence	  in	  
a	  superstructure	  that	  is	  dictated	  by	  a	  materialistic	  capitalist	  ideology.	  The	  owning	  
class	  under	  capitalism	  (which	  of	  course,	  comprises	  less	  than	  one	  percent	  of	  society	  
as	  a	  whole)	  wields	  social	  power	  that	  extends	  beyond	  the	  realm	  of	  economics	  
“Capital	  is,	  therefore,	  not	  a	  personal,	  it	  is	  a	  social	  power”	  (qtd.	  in:	  Calhoun	  et.	  al.	  
2002,	  p.	  166).	  Furthermore,	  all	  institutions	  of	  capitalist	  society	  ought	  to	  be	  
considered	  to	  be	  under	  the	  far-­‐reaching	  influence	  of	  the	  minority	  owning	  class	  –	  
Marx’s	  bourgeoisie.	  Law,	  as	  mentioned,	  is	  no	  exception	  to	  this	  rule;	  “Law,	  morality	  
and	  religion	  are	  to	  him	  [the	  proletariat]	  so	  many	  bourgeois	  prejudices,	  behind	  
which	  lurk	  in	  ambush	  just	  as	  many	  bourgeois	  interests”	  (qtd.	  in:	  Calhoun	  et.	  al.	  
2002,	  p.	  164).	  	  Being	  one	  of	  society’s	  greatest	  tools	  of	  social	  control	  and	  power,	  law	  
is	  defined	  and	  implemented	  in	  line	  with	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  economic	  elite,	  and	  
subsequently,	  the	  dominant	  class	  of	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	  In	  defining	  law	  in	  society,	  
and	  fundamentally	  acting	  out	  of	  self	  -­‐	  interest	  (the	  interests	  of	  the	  class	  as	  a	  whole,	  
not	  individualized	  self	  -­‐	  	  interest)	  the	  bourgeoisie	  axiomatically	  constructs	  law	  such	  
that	  the	  existing	  hegemonic	  structure	  is	  perpetuated	  –	  a	  structure	  that	  
systematically	  allocates	  immense	  social	  power	  to	  those	  with	  the	  most	  material	  
wealth,	  and	  oppresses	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  society.	  Law,	  as	  well	  as	  all	  other	  social	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institutions	  such	  as	  education,	  even	  religion,	  exist	  under	  the	  reign	  of	  bourgeois	  
dominance,	  and	  therefore	  promote	  this	  existing	  cultural	  hegemonic	  structure	  of	  the	  
society	  in	  which	  they	  exist.	  	  	  This	  is	  the	  “orthodox”	  deterministic	  interpretation	  of	  
Marx’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  of	  law	  to	  the	  economic	  foundation	  of	  
society.	  
	   This	  section	  –	  a	  Marxist	  interpretation	  of	  the	  sociology	  of	  law	  –	  seeks	  to	  delve	  
deeper	  into	  the	  notion	  presented	  above;	  that	  is,	  it	  seeks	  to	  examine	  law	  as	  a	  
fundamentally	  hegemonic	  discourse,	  defined	  by	  the	  economically	  elite,	  thus	  
perpetuating	  their	  own	  class-­‐based	  interests.	  The	  two	  concepts	  (power	  and	  conflict)	  
are	  fundamentally	  linked;	  “Wherever	  men	  live	  together	  conflict	  and	  a	  struggle	  for	  
power	  will	  be	  found”	  (qtd.	  in:	  Quinney,	  1970,	  p.	  11).	  In	  order	  to	  adequately	  discuss	  
the	  concepts	  of	  social	  power	  and	  conflict,	  and	  further,	  to	  describe	  the	  role	  of	  law	  as	  
it	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  creating	  or	  maintaining	  said	  concepts,	  this	  section	  will	  
utilize	  three	  interpretations	  of	  Marx’s	  theory:	  Determinist,	  Semi-­‐	  Autonomous,	  and	  
Dialectical.	  The	  three	  interpretations	  will	  be	  discussed	  separately.	  	  The	  determinist	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  Marxian	  structure	  versus	  superstructure	  theory	  discussed	  law	  
specifically	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  economic	  power	  of	  the	  economic	  elite.	  Putting	  aside	  all	  other	  
cultural	  factors,	  this	  approach	  discusses	  ways	  in	  which	  laws	  directly	  promote	  the	  
economic	  interests	  of	  the	  owning	  class,	  perpetuating	  their	  economic	  power	  –	  a	  type	  
of	  power	  that	  implies	  greater	  social	  power.	  The	  semi-­‐autonomy	  perspective	  
discusses	  law	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  relationship	  to	  the	  economic	  structure,	  but	  looks	  upon	  
other	  societal	  phenomena	  and	  forms	  of	  conflict	  beyond	  class	  as	  conducive	  to	  the	  
production	  of	  social	  power	  affecting	  the	  formation	  of	  laws.	  Lastly,	  from	  a	  dialectical	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Marxist	  perspective,	  the	  relationship	  between	  law	  and	  economy	  may	  be	  viewed	  as	  
reciprocal	  in	  nature.	  This	  way,	  the	  biased	  construction	  of	  law	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  
highly	  reflexive.	  While	  this	  approach	  maintains	  that	  economic	  factors	  ought	  to	  be	  
considered	  to	  shape	  the	  construction	  of	  law,	  the	  same	  is	  true	  in	  reverse	  –	  the	  law	  
similarly	  shapes	  the	  economic	  structure	  of	  society.	  In	  discussing	  this	  perspective,	  
the	  institution	  of	  slavery,	  and	  the	  history	  of	  the	  abolition	  of	  slavery	  will	  be	  used	  as	  
an	  example;	  while	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  economic	  system	  of	  slavery	  was	  largely	  
dependent	  on	  law,	  similarly,	  the	  legality	  of	  slave	  ownership	  was	  determined	  by	  the	  
existence	  of	  the	  slave	  economy,	  thus	  demonstrating	  the	  dialectical	  relationship	  
between	  law	  and	  economy.	  	  In	  combining	  the	  three	  aforementioned	  approaches,	  this	  
section	  will	  establish	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  single	  power	  holding	  social	  group,	  which	  
defines	  legal	  discourse.	  This	  group,	  though	  constantly	  challenged	  by	  their	  
subordinates,	  maintains	  their	  social	  dominance	  through	  economic	  exploitation,	  
largely	  implemented	  through	  law.	  This	  immensely	  wealthy,	  and	  culturally	  
homogenous	  group	  has	  been	  defined	  as	  The	  Power	  Elite	  (Mills,	  1956).	  The	  economic,	  
and	  subsequently,	  social	  dominance	  wielded	  by	  the	  ‘power	  elite’,	  here	  referred	  to	  as	  
the	  modern	  bourgeoisie,	  necessarily	  implies	  an	  immense	  influence	  on	  the	  
construction	  of	  law	  from	  the	  conflict	  perspective	  as	  discussed	  at	  length	  here.	  
	  
Law	  as	  a	  Reflection	  of	  Bourgeois	  Economic	  Interests:	  The	  Determinist	  Perspective	  
	   As	  introduced	  above,	  the	  deterministic	  approach	  to	  the	  sociology	  of	  law	  
suggests	  that	  the	  law	  that	  governs	  a	  given	  society	  is	  directly	  related	  to	  that	  society’s	  
economy;	  specifically,	  the	  former	  is	  shaped	  as	  a	  direct	  reflection	  or	  consequence	  of	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the	  latter.	  The	  economic	  superstructure	  therefore	  determines	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  
society’s	  definition	  of	  law	  and	  criminality.	  The	  deterministic	  perspective	  discusses	  
the	  law	  and	  the	  economy	  from	  a	  strictly	  classical	  Marxist	  approach.	  That	  is,	  instead	  
of	  considering	  various	  social	  factors	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  law,	  the	  deterministic	  
approach	  suggests	  that	  law	  is	  nothing	  but	  a	  reflection	  of	  or,	  is	  determined	  by,	  the	  
economic	  structure.	  The	  same	  is	  not	  true	  in	  reverse,	  as	  seen	  in	  the	  dialectical	  
perspective.	  A	  key	  theory	  as	  presented	  in	  Marxist	  thought	  that	  helps	  to	  support	  the	  
deterministic	  approach	  is	  the	  theory	  of	  historical	  materialism	  –	  that	  is,	  Marx’s	  
materialist	  conception	  of	  history	  which	  suggests	  that	  history	  ought	  to	  be	  
understood	  in	  a	  purely	  empirical	  way	  –	  or	  an	  understanding	  of	  society	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  
ever	  changing	  modes	  of	  production	  and	  division	  of	  labor	  (Marx	  &	  Engels,	  1845)	  
	   In	  order	  to	  properly	  situate	  this	  discussion,	  a	  previously	  cited	  quotation	  from	  
The	  Communist	  Manifesto	  (1848)	  will	  be	  elaborated	  upon.	  Marx	  writes:	  	  
“Freeman	  and	  slave,	  patrician	  and	  plebian,	  lord	  and	  serf,	  guild-­‐master	  and	  
journeyman,	  in	  a	  word,	  oppressor	  and	  oppressed,	  stood	  in	  constant	  
opposition	  to	  one	  another	  carried	  on	  an	  uninterrupted,	  now	  hidden,	  now	  
open	  fight,	  a	  fight	  that	  each	  time	  ended,	  either	  in	  a	  revolutionary	  re-­‐
constitution	  of	  society	  at	  large,	  or	  in	  the	  common	  ruin	  of	  the	  contending	  
classes”	  (qtd.	  in:	  Calhoun	  et.	  al.	  2002,	  p.	  156).	  
	  
Marx’s	  protracted,	  poetic	  opening	  to	  his	  massively	  influential	  manifesto	  sums	  up	  the	  	  
essential	  concept	  of	  historical	  materialism.	  From	  ancient	  times	  (defined	  by	  the	  
freeman-­‐slave	  paradigm),	  through	  the	  Middle	  Ages	  defined	  by	  feudalism	  (the	  lord-­‐
serf	  paradigm),	  and	  into	  modernity,	  Marx	  suggests	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  fundamental	  
binary	  conflict	  within	  society.	  Regardless	  of	  the	  economic	  structure	  that	  happens	  to	  
define	  the	  society,	  there	  will	  always	  be	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  ‘haves’	  and	  ‘have-­‐
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nots’	  –	  the	  bourgeoisie	  and	  the	  proletariat,	  respectively.	  	  Marx	  goes	  on	  to	  explain	  
that	  under	  capitalism,	  the	  ultimate	  class	  conflict	  exists	  as	  the	  economic	  disparity	  
between	  the	  opposing	  classes	  reaches	  its	  most	  prevalent	  form.	  Therefore,	  as	  the	  
economic	  structure	  of	  the	  contemporary	  world	  is	  dominated	  by	  capitalism,	  the	  
conflict	  between	  classes	  is	  more	  intense	  than	  during	  any	  point	  in	  history	  prior.	  
Furthermore,	  the	  percentage	  of	  the	  population	  that	  may	  be	  considered	  to	  make	  up	  
the	  bourgeois	  is	  lower	  than	  ever,	  which	  only	  adds	  to	  the	  binary	  class	  antagonism	  
that	  exists	  today.	  	  
	   The	  question	  that	  is	  put	  forward	  then	  is:	  how	  exactly	  does	  capitalism	  –	  the	  
ultimate	  form	  of	  binary	  class	  conflict	  –	  shape	  the	  law?	  Marx	  suggests	  that	  due	  to	  the	  
immense	  economic	  discrepancy,	  and	  subsequently	  the	  discrepancy	  in	  social	  power	  
between	  the	  opposing	  classes,	  and	  the	  necessary	  struggle	  on	  the	  part	  of	  both	  classes	  
to	  either	  achieve	  or	  maintain	  economic	  and	  social	  power,	  law	  under	  capitalism	  is	  
defined	  by	  inequality.	  Law	  may	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  both	  a	  bourgeois	  tool	  of	  
economic	  and	  social	  oppression,	  as	  well	  as	  simply	  a	  result	  of	  said	  oppression.	  In	  the	  
case	  of	  the	  former,	  the	  economically	  powerful	  directly	  influence	  the	  politically	  
powerful	  (it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  the	  two	  are	  indeed	  synonymous)	  in	  creating	  laws,	  
which	  seek	  to	  protect	  bourgeois	  interests,	  and	  suppress	  those	  of	  the	  proletariat.	  
Contrastingly,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  latter,	  the	  fundamental	  and	  immense	  inequality	  that	  
exists	  in	  the	  capitalist	  structure	  normalizes	  bourgeois	  dominance	  through	  law;	  
further,	  the	  class	  consciousness	  that	  exists	  in	  both	  opposing	  classes	  legitimizes	  
otherwise	  illegitimate	  legal	  practices	  implemented	  by	  the	  powerful	  bourgeois.	  The	  
inadequately	  organized	  proletariat,	  who	  therefore	  lack	  a	  strong	  class	  consciousness	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as	  compared	  to	  that	  of	  the	  opposing	  class,	  are	  incapable	  of	  voicing	  their	  collective	  
displeasure	  toward	  the	  illegitimate	  laws	  implemented	  and	  normalized	  by	  the	  
ideologically	  ‘superior’	  bourgeoisie.	  Regardless	  of	  which	  of	  these	  two	  scenarios	  
applies	  to	  a	  given	  law	  or	  legal	  concept,	  it	  may	  be	  argued	  that	  both	  are	  examples	  of	  
economic	  issues	  determining	  legal	  issues.	  In	  order	  to	  discuss	  the	  deterministic	  
approach	  using	  an	  empirical	  instance	  of	  an	  economic	  phenomenon	  directly	  effecting	  
the	  social	  definition	  of	  law,	  the	  remaining	  part	  of	  this	  section	  will	  consider	  issues	  of	  
white-­‐collar	  crime,	  which	  might	  be	  considered	  an	  example	  of	  bourgeois	  influence	  in	  
the	  legal	  system.	  	  	  	  
	   The	  issue	  of	  white-­‐collar,	  or	  corporate	  criminality	  exemplifies	  the	  ability	  of	  
the	  economically	  elite	  to	  directly	  influence	  the	  construction	  of	  law	  in	  the	  
contemporary	  context.	  The	  corporate	  elite	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  richest	  of	  the	  rich	  in	  modern	  
capitalism	  –	  possess	  the	  ability	  to	  directly	  shape	  laws	  in	  accordance	  with	  their	  own	  
interests.	  This	  ability	  to	  actively	  construct	  favorable	  law	  stems	  from	  the	  previously	  
suggested	  notion	  that	  indeed,	  the	  economic	  elite	  (in	  this	  case	  the	  corporate	  elite)	  is	  
synonymous	  with	  the	  political	  elite	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  similar	  interests	  and	  values	  –	  a	  
result	  of	  similar	  social	  background,	  education,	  and	  other	  cultural	  values	  and	  beliefs.	  
The	  economic	  elite	  may	  explicitly	  influence	  politics	  (through	  buying	  votes,	  lobbying	  
policies,	  etc.),	  or	  implicitly,	  through	  longstanding	  social	  and	  cultural	  connections	  
between	  the	  rich	  and	  the	  politically	  powerful.	  	  Quinney	  (1970)	  articulates	  this	  
concept	  in	  his	  discussion	  of	  the	  ‘formulation	  of	  criminal	  definitions’:	  
	  
“The	  interests	  –	  based	  on	  desires,	  values	  and	  norms	  –	  which	  are	  ultimately	  
incorporated	  into	  the	  criminal	  law	  are	  those	  which	  are	  treasured	  by	  the	  
dominant	  interest	  groups	  in	  society.	  In	  other	  words,	  those	  who	  have	  the	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ability	  to	  have	  their	  interests	  represented	  in	  public	  policy	  regulate	  the	  
formulation	  of	  criminal	  definitions”	  (Quinney,	  1970,	  p.	  16-­‐17)	  
	  
Quinney	  demonstrates	  the	  direct	  effect	  that	  the	  corporate	  (or	  economically)	  elite	  –	  
here	  referred	  to	  generally	  as	  the	  bourgeois	  –	  have	  on	  the	  construction	  of	  criminality	  
and	  therefore,	  law	  itself.	  	  
	   Furthermore,	  by	  regulating	  and	  defining	  criminality,	  the	  bourgeois	  reap	  the	  
benefits	  of	  a	  legal	  system,	  which	  is	  entrenched	  in	  class-­‐based	  bias.	  In	  many	  cases,	  
white-­‐collar	  criminality	  goes	  without	  legal	  reprimand,	  although	  the	  commission	  of	  
these	  crimes	  causes	  greater	  social	  harm	  than	  conventional	  crimes,	  traditionally	  
committed	  by	  the	  economically	  subordinate	  factions	  of	  society.	  Both	  the	  legal	  
system	  itself,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  field	  of	  criminology	  as	  a	  whole,	  tend	  to	  place	  less	  
emphasis	  on	  crimes	  committed	  by	  the	  rich,	  and	  therefore	  further	  associate	  the	  poor	  
with	  criminality:	  
“Law	  is	  like	  a	  cobweb;	  its	  made	  for	  flies	  and	  the	  smaller	  types	  of	  insects,	  so	  to	  
speak,	  but	  lets	  the	  big	  bumblebees	  break	  through.	  When	  technicalities	  of	  the	  
law	  stood	  in	  my	  way,	  I	  have	  always	  been	  able	  to	  brush	  them	  aside	  easy	  as	  
anything”	  	  (Sutherland,	  1940,	  p.	  8-­‐9).	  	  
	  
Sutherland	  goes	  on	  to	  explain	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  quote	  of	  a	  Daniel	  Drew,	  a	  man	  
described	  as	  a	  ‘pious	  old	  fraud’,	  “It	  means	  only	  that	  the	  upper	  class	  has	  greater	  
influence	  in	  molding	  the	  criminal	  law	  and	  its	  administration	  to	  its	  own	  interests	  
than	  does	  the	  lower	  class”	  (Sutherland,	  1940,	  p.	  9).	  	  	  
	   Both	  Sutherland	  and	  Quinney	  discuss	  the	  direct,	  empirical	  impact	  that	  the	  
bourgeois	  have	  on	  the	  construction	  of	  law.	  Their	  immense	  economic	  power	  implies	  
social	  and	  political	  power,	  therefore	  fostering	  the	  ability	  to	  shape	  laws	  such	  that	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their	  own	  economic	  profits	  are	  not	  hindered,	  and	  those	  of	  the	  proletariat	  are	  
restricted.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  definition	  of	  criminality,	  and	  subsequently,	  law,	  are	  once	  
again	  viewed	  as	  tools	  of	  maintaining	  the	  existing	  social	  hierarchy,	  and	  sustaining	  the	  
already	  immensely	  significant	  binary	  class	  conflict	  of	  modern	  corporate	  capitalism.	  
Not	  only	  does	  bourgeois	  power	  allow	  law	  to	  be	  directly	  shaped	  by	  the	  economically	  
elite,	  but	  also	  the	  normalization	  of	  the	  immense	  power	  discrepancy	  under	  
capitalism	  facilitates	  the	  legitimization	  of	  illegitimate	  application	  of	  said	  power	  
through	  law.	  Law	  may	  therefore	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  oppression,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
a	  fundamentally	  oppressive	  economic	  structure.	  	  
	   Marx’s	  theory	  of	  historical	  materialism	  suggests	  that	  under	  capitalism,	  class	  
conflict	  –	  between	  bourgeoisie	  and	  proletariat	  –	  reaches	  a	  pinnacle.	  At	  no	  other	  time	  
in	  history	  has	  the	  antagonism	  between	  owning	  and	  working	  class	  been	  quite	  as	  
strong	  as	  it	  is	  under	  modern	  capitalism;	  furthermore,	  in	  an	  era	  of	  corporate	  
capitalism,	  in	  which	  class	  conflict	  is	  even	  more	  extreme,	  and	  the	  economically	  and	  
politically	  elite	  are	  indeed	  synonymous,	  the	  laws	  of	  society	  are	  increasingly	  
influenced	  by	  the	  bourgeois.	  As	  discussed	  through	  the	  modern	  notion	  of	  corporate	  
crime,	  the	  legal	  system	  may	  be	  seen	  to	  systematically	  promote	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  
modern	  bourgeoisie,	  the	  corporate	  elite.	  It	  may	  be	  concluded	  through	  the	  use	  of	  
Marx’s	  theory	  of	  historical	  materialism	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  deterministic	  
approach	  to	  Marx’s	  sociology	  of	  law,	  that	  the	  economic	  structure	  of	  society	  (in	  this	  
case,	  one	  that	  promotes	  massive	  class	  antagonism	  under	  corporate	  capitalism)	  
necessarily	  influences	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  law,	  as	  seen	  in	  the	  example	  of	  the	  
lack	  of	  legal	  reprimand	  in	  cases	  of	  corporate	  crime.	  The	  legal	  system	  is	  indeed	  under	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the	  direct	  influence	  of	  the	  economically	  powerful,	  making	  the	  economically	  
powerful	  synonymous	  with	  the	  politically	  and	  socially	  powerful	  –	  a	  concept	  that	  
defines	  the	  modern	  bourgeoisie.	  	  
	  
Law	  as	  a	  Tool	  of	  Maintaining	  Cultural	  Hegemony:	  the	  Semi-­‐Autonomy	  Perspective	  	  
	   Unlike	  the	  aforementioned	  deterministic	  approach	  to	  Marx’s	  sociology	  of	  
law,	  the	  semi-­‐autonomous	  approach,	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  at	  some	  length	  here,	  
suggests	  that	  law	  is	  shaped	  by	  an	  array	  of	  social	  and	  cultural	  factors.	  The	  semi-­‐
autonomy	  approach	  still	  maintains	  the	  aforementioned	  Marxist	  view	  that	  law	  is	  
often	  used	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  social	  power.	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  defined	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  
economic	  interests	  of	  the	  dominant	  class	  are	  protected	  and	  perpetuated,	  
maintaining	  the	  existing	  social	  hierarchy.	  In	  this	  way,	  this	  approach	  corresponds	  
with	  the	  deterministic	  approach	  in	  that	  it	  maintains	  the	  necessary	  relationship	  
between	  law	  and	  economy	  –	  a	  fundamental	  characteristic	  of	  law	  according	  to	  Marx.	  
The	  semi-­‐autonomy	  approach	  differentiates	  itself	  by	  expanding	  on	  the	  previous	  
approach.	  Rather	  than	  suggesting	  that	  law	  is	  solely	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  economy,	  from	  
this	  perspective,	  law	  is	  shaped	  by	  various	  social	  factors	  in	  addition	  to	  economic	  
factors.	  Miliband	  (1977)	  articulates	  the	  semi-­‐autonomous	  Marxist	  view	  of	  conflict	  as	  
it	  may	  be	  interpreted	  beyond	  the	  realm	  of	  economic	  class	  conflict:	  
“The	  focus,	  always,	  is	  on	  class	  antagonism	  and	  class	  conflict.	  This	  does	  not	  
mean	  that	  Marxism	  does	  not	  recognize	  the	  existence	  of	  other	  kinds	  of	  conflict	  
within	  societies	  and	  between	  them	  –	  ethnic,	  religious,	  national,	  etc.	  But	  it	  
does	  consider	  these	  rivalries,	  conflicts,	  and	  wars	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  




Indeed,	  the	  semi-­‐autonomy	  approach	  maintains	  a	  fundamentally	  Marxist	  focus	  on	  
the	  concept	  of	  economic	  class	  conflict.	  However,	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  
construction	  and	  definition	  of	  law	  and	  in	  a	  generalized	  discussion	  of	  Marxist	  
thought	  as	  presented	  above,	  other	  social	  and	  cultural	  factors	  may	  significantly	  
contribute	  to	  the	  overall	  social	  conflict	  and	  the	  struggle	  for	  social	  power.	  In	  terms	  of	  
the	  sociology	  of	  law	  in	  particular,	  law	  may	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  reflection	  of	  
economic	  dominance,	  and	  further,	  socio-­‐cultural	  factors	  such	  as	  race,	  gender,	  and	  
political	  values	  may	  be	  seen	  to	  play	  a	  role	  in	  shaping	  law.	  	  The	  minority	  power	  
group	  within	  a	  society,	  which	  has	  been	  previously	  defined	  as	  the	  economically	  elite,	  
may	  therefore	  be	  defined	  in	  this	  section	  as	  the	  power	  elite	  –	  their	  economic	  power	  
necessarily	  implies	  cultural/social	  power	  –	  a	  concept	  briefly	  introduced	  in	  the	  
preceding	  section.	  	  	  
	   The	  social	  oppression	  implemented	  by	  the	  power	  elite,	  which	  seeks	  to	  
actively	  oppress	  the	  subordinate	  masses	  in	  order	  to	  perpetuate	  their	  own	  economic	  
and	  social	  interests	  is	  not	  coincidental.	  As	  discussed,	  the	  elite	  share	  a	  common	  
characteristic	  –	  immense	  wealth.	  It	  is	  suggested	  here,	  however,	  that	  their	  monetary	  
superiority	  is	  not	  their	  only	  common	  thread,	  	  
“…	  The	  people	  who	  are	  located	  in	  the	  commanding	  heights	  of	  the	  state,	  in	  the	  
executive,	  administrative,	  repressive	  and	  legislative	  branches,	  have	  tended	  to	  
belong	  to	  the	  same	  class	  or	  classes	  which	  have	  dominated	  the	  other	  strategic	  
heights	  of	  society,	  notably	  the	  economic	  and	  cultural	  ones”	  (Miliband,	  1977,	  
p.	  68).	  
	  
Furthermore,	  the	  elite	  are	  what	  will	  be	  referred	  to	  here	  as,	  culturally	  homogenous.	  
They	  tend	  to	  be	  white,	  conservative	  males.	  As	  the	  power	  holding	  group,	  their	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policies,	  and	  indeed,	  their	  definitions	  of	  law	  necessarily	  reflect	  the	  interests	  of	  said	  
demographics.	  
“The	  assumption	  which	  is	  at	  work	  here	  is	  that	  a	  common	  social	  background	  
and	  origin,	  education,	  connections,	  kinship,	  and	  friendship,	  a	  similar	  way	  of	  
life,	  result	  in	  a	  cluster	  of	  ideological	  and	  political	  positions	  and	  attitudes,	  
common	  values	  and	  perspectives”	  (Miliband,	  1977,	  p.	  69).	  	  
	  
While	  the	  elite	  seek	  to	  oppress	  the	  economically	  inferior	  through	  biased	  legal	  
discourse,	  they	  simultaneously	  oppress	  social	  and	  cultural	  groups	  that	  are	  
considered	  to	  be	  outside	  the	  culturally	  homogenous	  bourgeois.	  Law	  is	  therefore	  not	  
only	  a	  tool	  of	  maintaining	  the	  economic	  power	  of	  the	  bourgeois,	  but	  their	  social	  
dominance	  as	  well.	  Racialized	  and	  gendered	  populations,	  as	  well	  as	  those	  who	  hold	  
non-­‐mainstream	  political	  views	  may	  be	  defined	  as	  the	  cultural	  proletariat,	  as	  they	  
share	  a	  common	  power	  struggle	  and	  are	  in	  constant	  conflict	  with	  the	  bourgeois;	  that	  
is,	  the	  socio-­‐cultural	  bourgeoisie.	  	  	  
	   By	  expanding	  upon	  the	  previously	  discussed	  deterministic	  approach	  to	  
Marx’s	  sociology	  of	  law,	  this	  section	  –	  the	  semi-­‐autonomous	  approach	  –	  has	  
suggested	  that	  not	  only	  is	  the	  law	  shaped	  by	  issues	  of	  economics,	  and	  furthermore,	  
the	  economically	  elite,	  but	  rather,	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  social	  and	  cultural	  factors	  ought	  to	  
be	  included	  in	  discussing	  the	  social	  production	  of	  law.	  While	  the	  deterministic	  
approach	  has	  suggested	  that	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  elite	  are	  somewhat	  
synonymous	  due	  to	  the	  direct	  impact	  matters	  of	  economics	  have	  on	  law,	  the	  semi-­‐
autonomous	  approach	  suggests	  that	  in	  fact,	  the	  economic	  elite	  similarly	  wield	  
cultural	  power.	  The	  semi-­‐autonomous	  approach	  therefore	  suggests	  that	  the	  
bourgeoisie	  (which	  from	  a	  Marxist	  perspective	  necessarily	  holds	  a	  heavy	  influence	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on	  the	  construction	  of	  law)	  defines	  criminality	  and	  law	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  protects	  
their	  economic	  interests	  (and	  therefore	  maintains	  their	  position	  atop	  the	  social	  
hierarchy),	  while	  also	  defining	  criminality	  and	  law	  such	  that	  it	  systematically	  
disadvantages	  racialized,	  gendered,	  and	  politically	  anomalous	  populations.	  	  	  
	  
The	  Reciprocal	  Relationship	  of	  Law	  and	  Economy:	  The	  Dialectical	  Perspective	  	  
	   The	  third	  and	  final	  approach	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  conflict	  perspective	  of	  
the	  sociology	  of	  law	  is	  the	  dialectical	  approach.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  term	  ‘dialectical’	  
does	  not	  refer	  to	  Marxist	  theory,	  as	  in	  the	  theory	  of	  historical	  materialism,	  rather,	  
the	  term	  ‘dialectical’	  here	  refers	  to	  a	  particular	  understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  
between	  economy	  and	  law.	  Specifically,	  from	  this	  perspective,	  the	  relationship	  
between	  the	  two	  is	  to	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  somewhat	  symbiotic.	  Specifically,	  the	  two	  
concepts	  are	  mutually	  dependent	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  
two	  may	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  reciprocal.	  Unlike	  the	  deterministic	  approach,	  which	  
suggests	  that	  the	  law	  is	  shaped	  by	  the	  economy,	  and	  that	  said	  influence	  is	  
unidirectional,	  the	  dialectical	  approach	  holds	  that	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  same	  may	  be	  
true	  in	  reverse	  –	  the	  law	  simultaneously	  shapes	  the	  economy.	  The	  relationship	  
between	  law	  and	  economy	  still	  exists	  as	  an	  essential	  aspect	  in	  the	  social	  
construction	  of	  law,	  however,	  it	  is	  suggested	  in	  a	  somewhat	  revised	  manner.	  The	  
dialectical	  approach	  is	  fundamentally	  different	  than	  the	  deterministic	  approach,	  as	  
previously	  discussed.	  It	  corresponds	  with	  the	  semi-­‐autonomous	  approach	  in	  that	  it	  
does	  not	  restrict	  itself	  to	  the	  consideration	  of	  strictly	  economically	  hegemonic	  
concepts	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  law	  but	  goes	  beyond	  that,	  claiming	  that	  law	  effects	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the	  economy.	  Rather,	  as	  in	  the	  semi-­‐autonomous	  approach,	  the	  dialectical	  approach	  
considers	  cultural	  factors	  in	  this	  sense;	  specifically,	  racial	  and	  economic	  factors	  will	  
be	  discussed	  here	  as	  factors	  in	  the	  construction	  and	  definition	  of	  law.	  	  
	   To	  firstly	  expand	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  role	  of	  race	  and	  economy	  as	  they	  
influence	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  law	  from	  the	  dialectical	  approach,	  this	  section	  
will	  specifically	  discuss	  racial	  minorities	  –	  namely	  African	  Americans	  in	  the	  United	  
States	  –	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  historical	  relationship	  to	  economic	  matters,	  and	  
subsequently,	  legal	  matters.	  Furthermore,	  this	  subject	  will	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  
dialectical	  approach	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  sociology	  of	  law.	  	  
	   As	  introduced	  above,	  this	  particular	  interpretation,	  which	  falls	  under	  the	  
conflict	  approach,	  suggests	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  law	  and	  economy	  is	  
‘reciprocal’	  in	  nature	  –	  the	  two	  simultaneously	  influence	  and	  shape	  one	  another.	  
Therefore,	  in	  an	  ever-­‐changing	  economic	  superstructure,	  as	  described	  in	  Marx’s	  
theory	  of	  historical	  materialism,	  law	  must	  be	  somewhat	  malleable.	  Similarly,	  as	  the	  
law	  itself	  changes	  over	  time	  as	  a	  result	  of	  influences	  outside	  the	  realm	  of	  economics,	  
the	  economic	  superstructure	  itself	  must	  also	  be	  in	  flux.	  The	  case	  of	  race	  relations	  in	  
the	  United	  States	  demonstrates	  this	  concept,	  as	  it	  will	  be	  argued	  here	  that	  the	  legal	  
and	  economic	  roles	  of	  African	  Americans	  have	  been	  continuously	  altered	  over	  the	  
course	  of	  history,	  suggesting	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  dialectical	  relationship	  between	  law	  
and	  economy.	  	  
	   Firstly,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  establish	  the	  economic	  influence	  on	  law	  alone,	  
similarly	  to	  the	  discussion	  in	  the	  deterministic	  section.	  This	  relationship	  will	  be	  
established	  through	  the	  discussion	  of	  slavery	  in	  the	  former	  confederacy	  prior	  to	  the	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civil	  war.	  The	  legality	  of	  slavery,	  which	  of	  course	  separated	  the	  North	  from	  the	  
South,	  is	  largely	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  war	  itself,	  however	  it	  should	  also	  
be	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  contributor	  to	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  South.	  In	  this	  case,	  one	  
particular	  economic	  elite	  prevailed	  over	  the	  other	  (the	  north	  over	  the	  south),	  
demanding	  that	  their	  ideological	  values	  be	  accepted	  across	  the	  entirety	  of	  what	  
would	  become	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Genovese	  (1973)	  largely	  attributes	  the	  decline	  of	  
slavery	  in	  the	  South,	  and	  therefore	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  Confederacy	  to	  economic	  
factors,	  	  
“At	  the	  close	  of	  the	  eighteenth	  century,	  the	  South	  stood	  in	  equal	  or	  superior	  
position	  to	  the	  North	  in	  all	  aspects	  of	  economic	  development.	  Since	  then	  the	  
South	  had	  fallen	  further	  and	  further	  behind.	  Wherein	  lay	  the	  differences	  
between	  North	  and	  South	  which	  could	  account	  for	  this?	  Slavery	  obviously	  
was	  the	  culprit”	  (Genovese,	  1973,	  p.	  234).	  
	  
Not	  only	  is	  it	  argued	  that	  slavery	  ought	  to	  be	  considered	  a	  burden	  to	  economic	  
growth	  and	  output,	  in	  fact,	  slavery	  directly	  opposes	  capitalism	  itself	  –	  an	  economic	  
structure	  held	  dear	  by	  the	  Americans	  both	  now	  and	  then.	  Genovese	  cites	  the	  work	  of	  
Mandle,	  supporting	  said	  notion:	  
“Mandle	  squarely	  faces	  the	  contradictory	  nature	  of	  the	  plantation	  system	  as	  
part	  of	  world	  capitalist	  development	  and	  yet	  as	  a	  system	  in	  itself	  with	  
powerful	  tendencies	  antagonistic	  to	  that	  development.”	  (Genovese	  1973,	  p.	  
144).	  	  
	  
Genovese’s	  argument,	  presented	  in	  his	  two-­‐volume	  work,	  The	  Slave	  Economies,	  
affirms	  that	  the	  economic	  system	  of	  slavery	  is	  in	  direct	  opposition	  to	  the	  modern	  
capitalist	  society.	  Furthermore,	  slavery	  necessarily	  promotes	  an	  anti-­‐bourgeois	  
system	  that	  restricts	  industrialization	  and	  mass	  economic	  production,	  both	  of	  which	  
were	  imminent	  in	  ante	  bellum	  America	  (Genovese	  &	  Fox-­‐Genovese,	  1979).	  Based	  on	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the	  contradictory	  nature	  of	  slavery	  as	  it	  pertains	  to	  the	  capitalist	  system,	  abolition	  
was	  both	  necessary	  and	  inevitable	  –	  as	  was	  the	  eventual	  Yankee	  victory.	  So,	  it	  was	  
economic	  interests	  (capitalism)	  that	  led	  to	  change	  in	  the	  law	  that,	  of	  course,	  changed	  
the	  economic	  structure	  in	  both	  the	  South	  and	  the	  North	  
In	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  concepts	  presented	  above	  by	  Genovese	  (1973),	  
Zimmerman	  (2012)	  discusses	  the	  transnational	  move	  away	  from	  a	  system	  of	  slavery	  
in	  the	  name	  of	  Capitalist	  development.	  Furthermore,	  Zimmerman	  discusses	  the	  
creation	  of	  what	  he	  refers	  to	  as	  the	  ‘Global	  South’	  –	  the	  racialized	  and	  highly	  
oppressed	  third	  world.	  Though	  slavery	  has	  largely	  been	  abolished	  over	  history,	  as	  in	  
the	  American	  South,	  Zimmerman	  argues	  that	  in	  fact,	  the	  Global	  South	  remains	  to	  be	  
the	  subject	  of	  widespread	  exploitation.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  abolishment	  of	  slavery,	  
the	  economic	  elites	  of	  the	  north	  have	  not	  halted	  all	  forms	  of	  economic	  and	  indeed	  
cultural	  exploitation	  of	  the	  South,	  but	  rather,	  have	  created	  new	  ways	  of	  asserting	  
global	  dominance,	  	  
“In	  response	  [to	  the	  abolishment	  of	  slavery],	  Elites,	  both	  new	  and	  old,	  
invented	  ways	  to	  divert	  this	  newly	  won	  freedom	  into	  channels	  of	  state	  power	  
and	  capital	  accumulation”	  (Zimmerman,	  2012,	  p.	  237).	  	  
	  
Similarly	  to	  the	  preceding	  argument,	  Zimmerman	  suggests	  that	  slavery,	  in	  light	  of	  
ever-­‐modernizing	  capitalism	  had	  become	  a	  burden	  to	  bourgeois	  accumulation.	  
Abolition	  ought	  to	  be	  seen	  not	  as	  an	  independent	  change	  in	  legal	  discourse,	  based	  
solely	  on	  an	  increase	  in	  recognition	  of	  basic	  human	  rights,	  but	  rather,	  a	  reflection	  of	  
the	  economic	  structure.	  	  
	   Contrastingly,	  it	  may	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  reverse	  is	  true,	  while	  not	  necessarily	  
rejecting	  the	  deterministic	  dimension	  of	  this	  concept.	  Alexander	  (2010)	  describes	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the	  African	  American	  experience	  as	  a	  history	  of	  exploitation,	  which	  has	  taken	  a	  
variety	  of	  shapes	  which	  “…cater	  to	  the	  needs	  and	  constraints	  of	  the	  time”	  
(Alexander,	  2010,	  p.	  21).	  From	  slavery	  came	  the	  Jim	  Crow	  Era,	  from	  the	  Jim	  Crow	  
era	  was	  born	  a	  new,	  more	  inconspicuous	  form	  of	  racial	  exploitation	  –	  mass	  
incarceration.	  Alexander	  doubts	  the	  true	  ‘emancipatory’	  nature	  of	  the	  Emancipation	  
Proclamation,	  and	  questions	  the	  seemingly	  unanimous	  feeling	  of	  accomplishment	  
toward	  the	  abolishment	  of	  the	  Jim	  Crow	  laws	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  
Movement	  as	  she	  argues,	  “…Jim	  Crow	  is	  dead,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  the	  
end	  of	  racial	  caste.	  If	  history	  is	  any	  guide,	  it	  may	  have	  taken	  a	  different	  form”	  
(Alexander,	  2010,	  p.	  21).	  Indeed	  racial	  caste	  has	  taken	  another	  form,	  and	  it	  is	  argued	  
here	  that	  not	  only	  has	  the	  racist	  structure	  of	  the	  American	  legal	  system	  changed,	  but	  
the	  economic	  exploitation	  of	  minorities	  has	  changed	  as	  well.	  Changes	  in	  the	  former	  
have	  determined	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  latter.	  	  	  	  	  
	   Almost	  immediately	  following	  the	  abolition	  of	  the	  Jim	  Crow	  laws,	  and	  
transition	  into	  a	  new	  era	  of	  racial	  oppression,	  the	  focus	  for	  civil	  rights	  leaders	  
became	  issues	  of	  economics.	  African	  Americans	  were	  soon	  largely	  locked	  in	  a	  cycle	  
of	  poverty,	  and	  shortly	  after,	  were	  incarcerated	  in	  immense	  numbers	  in	  an	  attempt	  
to	  crack	  down	  on	  crime;	  namely,	  drug	  related	  crime	  (Alexander,	  2010).	  As	  argued	  by	  
Alexander,	  the	  intersection	  of	  racial	  and	  economic	  oppression	  that	  began	  in	  the	  
slavery	  era	  and	  continues	  today	  into	  ‘the	  new	  Jim	  Crow	  era’,	  African	  Americans	  have	  
historically	  been	  systematically	  oppressed.	  By	  doing	  so,	  the	  white	  majority	  has	  
actively	  perpetuated	  their	  place	  atop	  the	  racial	  hierarchy,	  and	  subsequently,	  as	  what	  
has	  been	  deemed,	  the	  modern	  bourgeois.	  In	  this	  explanation	  of	  the	  history	  of	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American	  race	  relations,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  in	  fact	  a	  changing	  legal	  landscape	  (the	  
reconstruction	  era,	  the	  civil	  rights	  movement,	  etc.)	  has	  facilitated	  a	  change	  in	  the	  
mode	  of	  economic	  exploitation	  (from	  slavery	  to	  mass	  poverty/incarceration)	  of	  
racial	  minorities	  as	  well	  as	  the	  proletariat	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  The	  economic	  exploitation	  of	  
racial	  minorities	  in	  the	  United	  States	  may	  therefore	  be	  considered	  to	  exist	  to	  the	  
extent	  that	  the	  legal	  norms	  of	  the	  era	  allow.	  Slavery,	  of	  course,	  is	  no	  longer	  legal	  and	  
therefore	  may	  not	  exist.	  As	  argued	  by	  Alexander	  though,	  new	  forms	  of	  racial	  
oppression	  via	  economic	  factors	  are	  constantly	  taking	  shape	  in	  light	  of	  a	  shifting	  
legal	  landscape.	  	  
	   It	  may	  therefore	  be	  argued	  that	  while	  it	  is	  true	  that	  economic	  factors	  shape	  
legal	  concepts,	  especially	  when	  cultural	  factors	  are	  also	  considered	  (as	  presented	  in	  
the	  deterministic	  and	  semi-­‐autonomy	  approaches)	  it	  may	  also	  be	  true	  that	  the	  
reverse	  occurs	  simultaneously.	  Slavery	  was	  abolished	  due	  to	  the	  undeniable	  
economic	  force	  of	  capitalism;	  therefore	  the	  former	  must	  be	  true.	  Conversely,	  though	  
not	  contradictorily,	  white	  economic	  dominance	  has	  shifted	  over	  the	  course	  of	  
American	  history	  due	  to	  changes	  in	  legal	  discourse	  (i.e.	  the	  existence	  or	  lack	  there	  	  
of	  the	  legal	  entity	  of	  the	  slave).	  This	  reciprocal	  effect	  (of	  economic	  relations	  on	  legal	  
structures	  and	  vice	  versa)	  illustrates	  the	  Marxist	  dialectical	  approach	  in	  the	  








	   In	  the	  above	  discussion	  of	  the	  sociology	  of	  law	  from	  a	  Marxist	  perspective,	  
the	  general	  argument	  has	  been	  that	  law	  and	  the	  economy	  are	  fundamentally	  linked.	  
Furthermore,	  the	  ongoing	  societal	  conflict	  that	  arises	  from	  an	  uneven	  allocation	  of	  
social	  power	  –	  power,	  which	  is	  a	  function	  of	  economic	  wealth	  –	  results	  in	  a	  
fundamentally	  biased	  definition	  of	  law.	  The	  modern	  Bourgeoisie,	  which	  has	  been	  
defined	  similarly	  to	  Mills’	  (1956)	  definition	  of	  the	  Power	  Elite,	  is	  argued	  to	  define	  
law	  in	  line	  with	  their	  own	  selfish	  class	  interest.	  	  
	   The	  Deterministic	  perspective	  has	  suggested	  that	  law	  is	  fundamentally	  a	  
reflection	  of	  economic	  matters.	  Specifically,	  this	  section	  has	  discussed	  the	  concept	  of	  
corporate	  crime,	  as	  the	  economically	  powerful	  individuals	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  modern	  
corporation	  have	  been	  seen	  to	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  prosecuted	  by	  law;	  their	  economic	  
power	  necessarily	  suggests	  political/legal	  power.	  Secondly,	  from	  the	  Semi-­‐
Autonomy	  perspective,	  the	  prior	  approach	  was	  elaborated	  upon	  by	  suggesting	  that	  
the	  law	  is	  indeed	  a	  reflection	  of	  economic	  matters,	  however,	  other	  cultural	  factors	  
may	  be	  additionally	  considered	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  law	  (i.e.	  gender,	  race,	  political	  
views,	  etc.).	  The	  economic	  power	  of	  the	  bourgeoisie	  suggests	  a	  significant	  cultural	  
dominance.	  Lastly,	  from	  the	  Dialectical	  perspective,	  and	  discussed	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
concept	  of	  slavery,	  it	  was	  argued	  that	  the	  economy	  and	  the	  legal	  system	  share	  a	  
reciprocal	  relationship,	  a	  notion	  that	  should	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  most	  similar	  to	  
Weber’s	  sociology	  of	  law,	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  more	  depth	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  
The	  discussion	  of	  the	  three	  approaches	  provides	  a	  more	  holistic	  understanding	  of	  
the	  theory	  of	  historical	  materialism	  and	  the	  conflict	  perspective	  in	  the	  sociology	  of	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law.	  Though	  the	  three	  interpretations	  are	  conflicting,	  and	  thus	  exclusive	  of	  one	  
another,	  when	  considered	  in	  comparison	  to	  one	  another,	  they	  provide	  a	  more	  

























The	  Conflict	  Approach	  and	  the	  Law-­‐Economy	  Dialectical	  Relationship:	  Max	  Weber’s	  
Sociology	  of	  Law	  	  	  
	  
Building	  upon	  the	  preceding	  section,	  which	  discussed	  the	  sociology	  of	  law	  
from	  Marx’s	  conflict	  perspective,	  this	  section,	  is	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  sociology	  of	  
law	  based	  on	  the	  writings	  and	  perspective	  of	  the	  founder	  of	  the	  interpretive	  school	  
of	  sociological	  thought,	  Max	  Weber.	  Nevertheless,	  Weber	  constructs	  positivist	  
sociology	  of	  law	  as	  well.	  The	  typical	  interpretive	  focus	  that	  seeks	  to	  interpret	  
purposeful	  human	  action	  is	  not	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  Weberian	  sociology	  of	  law.	  Weber	  
views	  economic	  matters	  as	  crucial	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  social	  world.	  Law,	  
being	  an	  aspect	  of	  the	  social	  world,	  is	  therefore	  necessarily	  connected	  to	  matters	  of	  
economic	  life.	  The	  relationship	  between	  law	  and	  economy	  is	  a	  complex	  one,	  and	  can	  
be	  understood	  in	  more	  than	  one	  way.	  	  
	  The	  basis	  of	  this	  section	  is	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  relationship	  
Weber	  describes	  between	  economy	  and	  law.	  Similarly	  to	  the	  dialectical	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  conflict	  approach,	  Weber’s	  dialectical	  approach	  suggests	  a	  
reciprocal,	  or	  dialectical	  relationship	  between	  the	  law	  and	  the	  economic	  structure	  
within	  which	  it	  exists	  (Käsler,	  1988).	  Furthermore,	  Weber’s	  sociology	  of	  law	  is	  also	  
situated	  within	  the	  conflict	  perspective,	  as	  in	  his	  historical	  account	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  
capitalism	  Weber	  also	  sees	  different	  groups	  and	  classes	  competing	  for	  power.	  While	  
a	  given	  society’s	  economic	  structure	  may	  pave	  the	  way	  for	  the	  introduction	  of	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certain	  legal	  institutions,	  in	  a	  similar	  fashion,	  the	  existence	  of	  certain	  legal	  concepts	  
and	  institutions	  may	  influence,	  even	  determine,	  the	  economic	  structure.	  Weber	  also	  
largely	  drew	  upon	  historical	  analyses,	  particularly,	  around	  the	  development	  of	  
modern	  capitalism	  in	  his	  discussion	  of	  the	  development	  of	  law,	  and	  its	  necessary	  
relationship	  to	  the	  economy.	  Specifically,	  as	  will	  be	  explained,	  the	  development	  of	  
the	  modern	  capitalist	  system	  suggests	  an	  increasingly	  rational	  legal	  system.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  fully	  discuss	  Weber’s	  dialectical	  perspective	  to	  the	  law-­‐economy	  
relationship,	  this	  section	  will	  be	  divided	  into	  two	  main	  parts.	  Firstly,	  as	  a	  reflection	  
of	  the	  majority	  of	  Weber’s	  early	  works,	  the	  primary	  focus	  of	  this	  discussion	  of	  the	  
dialectical	  approach	  will	  be	  around	  the	  concept	  of	  material	  economic	  conditions	  and	  
law	  in	  a	  given	  society.	  Many	  of	  Weber’s	  early	  works	  discuss	  the	  emergence	  of	  
capitalist	  institutions,	  as	  a	  product	  of,	  and	  simultaneously	  producer	  of,	  particular	  
legal	  concepts.	  This	  discussion	  will	  largely	  focus	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  fundamentally	  
capitalist	  institutions	  within	  ancient	  civilizations.	  Furthermore,	  the	  section	  will	  
discuss	  the	  implications	  that	  these	  capitalist	  institutions	  –	  as	  they	  come	  to	  exist	  in	  a	  
pre-­‐capitalist	  society	  –	  have	  on	  the	  social	  construction	  and	  definition	  of	  law	  in	  the	  
ancient	  society	  in	  which	  they	  exist.	  Specifically,	  Weber’s	  Sociology	  of	  law	  will	  
discuss	  the	  historical	  relationship	  between	  material	  economic	  conditions	  and	  the	  
law,	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  capitalism,	  largely	  through	  the	  use	  of	  
Weber’s	  early	  works	  including:	  Contributions	  to	  the	  History	  of	  Medieval	  Business	  
Organizations	  (1889),	  Roman	  Agrarian	  History	  in	  its	  Relation	  to	  Roman	  Public	  and	  
Civil	  Law	  (1891),	  and	  “The	  Agrarian	  Sociology	  of	  Ancient	  Civilization”	  (1897;	  1898;	  
1909).	  Additionally,	  the	  basis	  of	  Weber’s	  conception	  of	  the	  sociology	  of	  law	  may	  be	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found	  in	  one	  of	  his	  most	  influential	  texts,	  Economy	  and	  Society	  (1922).	  Secondly,	  
largely	  through	  a	  discussion	  of	  Weber’s	  key	  work,	  The	  Protestant	  Ethic	  and	  the	  Spirit	  
of	  Capitalism	  (1904-­‐1905),	  ideological	  concepts,	  namely	  religion,	  will	  be	  introduced	  
as	  factors	  that	  shape	  the	  emergence	  of	  capitalism,	  and	  subsequently	  determine	  legal	  
concepts	  along	  with	  the	  aforementioned	  material	  economic	  conditions.	  This	  section	  
will	  seek	  to	  expand	  upon	  the	  aforementioned	  discussion	  that	  suggests	  that	  material	  
economic	  conditions	  alone	  determine	  law.	  Religion	  (ideology)	  and	  law	  stand	  
together	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  economy	  (i.e.	  in	  a	  dialectical	  relationship	  with	  it).	  This	  section	  
therefore	  suggests	  that	  ideology	  must	  at	  least	  be	  considered	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  
capitalism,	  specifically	  in	  the	  American	  example.	  Käsler	  (1988)	  discusses	  the	  multi-­‐
dimensional	  nature	  of	  Weber’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  sociology	  of	  law	  in	  a	  way	  that	  
demonstrates	  that	  not	  only	  should	  law	  be	  considered	  to	  share	  a	  reciprocal	  
relationship	  with	  the	  economy	  but	  in	  fact,	  various	  other	  social	  phenomena	  ought	  to	  
be	  considered	  in	  the	  shaping	  of	  the	  economic	  structure	  of	  society,	  	  
“…	  Weber	  treated	  the	  law	  as	  an	  area	  of	  historical	  and	  social	  reality,	  and	  he	  
analyzed	  the	  reciprocal,	  legal	  relationships	  between	  society,	  law,	  religion,	  
economy	  and	  domination”	  (Käsler,	  1988:	  p.	  144).	  	  
	  
Indeed,	  Weber’s	  sociology	  of	  law	  should	  not	  be	  understood	  in	  a	  manner	  which	  is	  
restricted	  to	  matters	  of	  economics,	  but	  rather	  it	  may	  be	  understood	  to	  include	  other	  
social	  factors	  as	  discussed	  above.	  This	  being	  said,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  that	  
the	  concept	  of	  reciprocity	  amongst	  all	  relevant	  social	  factors	  that	  are	  deemed	  to	  
shape	  law	  remains	  constant.	  By	  discussing	  the	  material	  economic	  conditions	  that	  
facilitate	  the	  emergence	  of	  capitalist	  institutions,	  and	  additionally	  discussing	  
ideological	  conditions	  that	  may	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  supplementary	  factors	  in	  this	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development,	  this	  discussion	  of	  the	  perspective	  will	  adequately	  discuss	  Weber’s	  
conception	  of	  the	  sociology	  of	  law	  in	  a	  comprehensive	  manner.	  	  	  	  
While	  class-­‐based	  economic	  conflict	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  sole	  focus	  of	  
Weber’s	  work	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  construction	  of	  law,	  matters	  of	  economics	  remain	  
crucial.	  The	  economic	  structure	  of	  a	  given	  society	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  law	  that	  
exists	  there,	  however	  law	  may	  also	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  economic	  
structure	  –	  the	  two	  are	  therefore	  necessarily	  connected,	  (Tastsoglou,	  2015:	  p.	  9).	  
Beginning	  with	  Weber’s	  sociological	  discussion	  of	  the	  transition	  from	  an	  ancient	  
civilization	  –	  in	  which	  the	  economy	  is	  defined	  by	  slavery	  –	  into	  a	  feudalist	  
civilization,	  defined	  by	  serf	  labor,	  and	  gradually	  wage	  labor	  (in	  capitalism),	  this	  
section	  will	  seek	  to	  synthesize	  the	  sociology	  of	  law	  according	  to	  Weber,	  and,	  
ultimately,	  address	  the	  problematic	  nature	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  law	  and	  
economy.	  	  
	  
Law	  and	  Economy:	  A	  Fundamentally	  Dialectical	  Relationship	  
	   To	  begin,	  this	  discussion	  will	  point	  to	  Weber’s	  first	  publication,	  Contributions	  
to	  the	  History	  of	  Medieval	  Business	  Organizations	  (1889),	  which	  was	  published	  as	  his	  
doctoral	  dissertation.	  The	  thesis	  of	  this	  work	  is	  that	  Germanic	  law	  inevitably	  
replaced	  ancient	  Roman	  law;	  both	  of	  which	  were	  very	  familiar	  to	  Weber,	  having	  a	  
legal	  background,	  and	  extensive	  knowledge	  of	  both	  of	  these	  types	  of	  legal	  
frameworks.	  The	  former,	  Roman	  law,	  was	  described	  as	  ‘individualistic’	  in	  nature,	  
and	  was	  necessarily	  “…displaced	  by	  certain	  assumptions	  of	  modern	  capitalism,	  
which	  derived	  from	  Germanic	  law”	  (Käsler,	  1988:	  p.	  25).	  The	  crucial	  aspect	  of	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Germanic	  law,	  from	  Weber’s	  perspective,	  that	  presupposed	  it	  to	  be	  the	  successor	  to	  
Roman	  law	  was	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  separate	  company	  fund,	  which	  would	  be	  capable	  
of	  assuming	  liability	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  company’s	  economic	  failure.	  This	  ‘separate	  
fund’	  is	  seen	  to	  be	  a	  fundamental	  aspect	  of	  the	  modern	  capitalist	  company,	  and	  as	  it	  
is	  absent	  in	  Roman	  law,	  Germanic	  law	  was	  where	  it	  originated.	  	  Therefore,	  Weber	  
argues	  that	  the	  transition	  from	  ancient	  society	  into	  a	  feudal	  society	  may	  be	  
attributed	  in	  part	  to	  the	  fusion	  of	  Germanic	  law	  into	  the	  ancient	  Roman	  system.	  
While	  the	  change	  in	  economic	  structure	  ought	  to	  be	  attributed	  to	  a	  changing	  legal	  
landscape,	  the	  same	  is	  true	  in	  reverse	  –	  the	  adoption	  of	  Germanic	  law	  as	  a	  
replacement	  of	  Roman	  law	  may	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  imminent	  rise	  of	  capitalism,	  and	  
capitalist	  institutions.	  The	  significance	  of	  this	  early	  work	  of	  Max	  Weber	  may	  not	  be	  
understated.	  Though	  it	  does	  not	  present	  a	  fully	  developed	  version	  of	  the	  dialectical	  
sociology	  of	  law,	  it	  introduces	  a	  theme	  that	  remained	  prevalent	  throughout	  the	  
course	  of	  Weber’s	  academic	  career,	  which	  is	  the	  development	  of	  capitalist	  
institutions	  (Tastsoglou,	  2015:	  p.	  8).	  This	  concept	  is	  key	  in	  this	  discussion	  of	  the	  
dialectical	  perspective	  of	  the	  sociology	  of	  law	  because	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  economic	  
institution	  of	  the	  ‘separate	  company	  fund’,	  and	  subsequently	  the	  rise	  of	  capitalism	  
itself,	  necessarily	  suggests	  a	  shift	  in	  law.	  This	  is	  a	  necessary	  assumption	  due	  to	  the	  
fact	  that	  the	  two	  social	  phenomena	  (law	  and	  economy)	  are	  here	  defined	  as	  mutually	  
dependent,	  or,	  sharing	  a	  relationship	  that	  may	  be	  considered	  reciprocal	  in	  nature.	  	  	  
	   As	  mentioned,	  the	  rise	  of	  capitalist	  institutions	  was	  a	  theme	  that	  may	  be	  
found	  throughout	  Weber’s	  writings.	  As	  discussed,	  a	  change	  in	  economic	  structure	  
suggests	  a	  change	  in	  law,	  as	  seen	  in	  the	  shift	  from	  Roman	  to	  Germanic	  law.	  In	  Roman	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Agrarian	  History	  in	  its	  Relations	  to	  Public	  and	  Civil	  Law	  (1891),	  Weber	  discussed	  the	  
emergence	  of	  another	  capitalist	  institution,	  as	  it	  existed	  in	  Rome	  –	  the	  institution	  of	  
private	  property	  –	  in	  its	  specific	  relationship	  to	  the	  law.	  Through	  his	  historical	  
discussion	  of	  land	  surveying,	  land	  taxation,	  and	  public	  vs.	  private	  land	  ownership,	  
Weber	  suggests	  that	  the	  changing	  economic	  and	  legal	  landscape	  of	  Rome	  facilitated	  
the	  rise	  of	  large	  privately	  owned	  estates,	  employing	  workers,	  no	  longer	  classified	  as	  
slaves	  (Weber,	  1891).	  In	  this	  work,	  Weber	  contends	  –	  as	  an	  expansion	  upon	  his	  
interest	  in	  the	  rise	  of	  capitalist	  institutions	  and	  their	  relation	  to	  law	  –	  that	  the	  
increase	  in	  private	  land	  ownership,	  a	  fundamentally	  capitalist	  institution,	  in	  
addition	  to	  legal	  changes	  in	  terms	  of	  land	  taxation	  and	  land	  surveying,	  as	  introduced	  
above,	  indeed	  facilitated	  the	  shift	  away	  from	  the	  ancient	  economic	  structure	  
(defined	  by	  the	  urban,	  coastal	  dwelling,	  and	  a	  slave-­‐based	  economy)	  (Weber,	  1896),	  
and	  toward	  a	  feudalist	  economic	  structure	  (defined	  by	  large-­‐scale	  private	  land	  
ownership,	  and	  a	  semi-­‐autonomous	  labor	  force).	  Law	  then,	  is	  discussed	  here	  as	  a	  
contributor	  to	  the	  new,	  emerging	  socio-­‐economic	  system	  of	  capitalism.	  The	  demise	  
of	  the	  ancient	  economic	  structure	  was	  inevitable	  and	  was	  a	  result	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  
capitalist	  legal	  and	  economic	  institutions.	  Late	  antiquity	  and	  the	  early	  Middle	  Ages	  
may	  be	  viewed	  as	  ‘transitional	  periods’	  –	  a	  part	  of	  the	  greater	  shift	  to	  capitalism	  
(Weber,	  1896;	  Weber,	  1909).	  	  
	   Weber’s	  essay,	  “Die	  Sozialen	  Gründe	  des	  Untergangs	  der	  Antiken	  Kultur”	  
(1896)	  –	  roughly	  translated	  from	  German	  to	  “The	  Social	  Causes	  for	  the	  Downfall	  of	  
Ancient	  Civilization”	  –	  further	  elaborates	  on	  his	  interest	  in	  the	  rise	  of	  capitalist	  
institutions	  out	  of	  ancient	  society,	  similarly	  to	  that	  which	  is	  discussed	  in	  Agrarian	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History	  in	  its	  Relations	  to	  Public	  and	  Civil	  Law	  (1891).	  It	  is	  emphasized	  that	  the	  
decline	  of	  the	  Roman	  Empire	  may	  be	  attributed	  to	  various	  causes,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  
aforementioned	  cause,	  the	  increase	  in	  privately	  owned	  estates,	  and	  subsequently	  
the	  downfall	  of	  the	  slave	  economy.	  	  
“Weber	  produced	  a	  résumé	  of	  the	  historical	  developments	  of	  Antiquity,	  while	  
confirming	  the	  disappearance	  of	  its	  decisive	  elements:	  the	  standing	  army,	  the	  
salaried	  civil	  service,	  the	  exchange	  of	  goods	  between	  loyalties,	  the	  city…”	  
(Käsler,	  1988:	  p.	  34)	  
	  
Weber	  therefore	  emphasized	  the	  importance	  of	  economic	  developments	  in	  the	  fall	  
of	  the	  Roman	  Empire,	  as	  has	  been	  discussed	  so	  far.	  In	  typical	  Weberian	  fashion,	  the	  
rise	  of	  said	  economic	  developments,	  which	  might	  be	  called	  capitalist	  institutions,	  
were	  observed	  through	  an	  ‘ideal	  typical’	  methodology,	  which	  sought	  to	  compare	  the	  
economic	  structures	  of	  Antiquity	  and	  the	  Middle	  Ages,	  each	  being	  a	  unique	  ideal	  
type	  of	  political	  economy.	  Weber	  (1896)	  concludes,	  as	  an	  expansion	  upon	  previous	  
work,	  that	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  latter	  may	  be	  attributed	  to	  –	  among	  other	  factors	  –	  the	  
decline	  of	  the	  urban	  city	  and	  a	  move	  toward	  a	  rural	  civilization,	  the	  free	  marketplace	  
being	  replaced	  by	  barter,	  and	  lastly,	  the	  legal	  entity	  of	  ‘the	  slave’	  being	  replaced	  by	  
‘the	  semi-­‐autonomous	  worker’	  (Weber,	  1896).	  Once	  again,	  Weber’s	  (1896)	  essay	  
suggests	  that	  there	  is	  a	  necessary	  reciprocal	  relationship	  between	  socio-­‐economic	  
matters	  (i.e.	  a	  shift	  to	  rural,	  agrarian	  civilization,	  barter	  replacing	  the	  free	  
marketplace)	  and	  legal	  ones	  (i.e.	  the	  means	  of	  production	  through	  slave	  ownership,	  
or	  lack	  thereof).	  The	  two	  types	  of	  social	  change	  indeed	  occur	  simultaneously,	  each	  
having	  mutual	  effect	  on	  the	  other.	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As	  in	  the	  dialectical	  Marxist	  perspective	  under	  the	  conflict	  approach,	  where	  
the	  definition	  of	  labor	  laws	  –	  namely	  regarding	  the	  institution	  of	  American	  slavery	  –	  
was	  attributed	  to	  economic	  interests,	  Weber	  suggests	  that	  the	  end	  of	  Roman	  
agrarian	  slavery	  was	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  fundamentally	  restricted	  the	  primary	  
goal	  of	  capitalism	  –	  the	  pursuit	  of	  elite	  profit.	  For	  slave	  owners,	  “…	  even	  though	  
slavery	  had	  shaped	  the	  organizations	  of	  agriculture,	  there	  were	  severe	  
disadvantages	  to	  the	  exclusive	  reliance	  on	  slaves”	  (Weber,	  1891;	  Trans:	  Frank,	  
2008:	  p.	  149).	  Indeed,	  the	  slave	  economy	  restricts	  the	  capital	  accumulation	  of	  the	  
slave	  owner,	  or,	  as	  they	  would	  become	  known,	  the	  landlord.	  This	  concept	  should	  be	  
considered	  an	  example	  of	  economic	  matters	  ‘driving’	  law.	  Widespread,	  and	  large-­‐
scale	  private	  land	  ownership	  –	  a	  capitalist	  institution	  –	  may	  be	  therefore	  understood	  
to	  be	  a	  consequence	  of,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  determinant	  of,	  legal	  and	  social	  concepts,	  namely	  
the	  shift	  to	  feudalism	  through	  the	  presence	  (or	  lack	  of)	  of	  slave	  labor.	  	  
Indeed,	  the	  rise	  of	  capitalist	  institutions	  –	  both	  legal	  and	  economic	  –	  are	  key	  
in	  the	  various	  early	  works	  of	  Weber,	  as	  discussed	  here.	  Weber	  develops	  a	  legal	  and	  
economic	  history	  wherein	  capitalism	  is	  the	  result.	  Under	  the	  dialectical	  approach,	  
the	  rise	  of	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  modern	  joint,	  or	  limited	  liability	  company,	  private	  
land	  ownership,	  and	  the	  semi-­‐autonomous	  labour	  force	  have	  both	  economic	  and	  
legal	  repercussions;	  furthermore,	  the	  existence	  of	  said	  institutions,	  and	  
subsequently,	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  capitalist	  system	  may	  not	  be	  attributed	  to	  factors	  of	  
economics	  or	  law	  on	  their	  own,	  rather,	  to	  both	  simultaneously.	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As	  discussed	  at	  length	  by	  Käsler	  (1988),	  the	  dialectical	  relationship	  between	  
law	  and	  economy	  is	  crucial	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  Weber’s	  sociology	  of	  law.	  
However,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  succeeding	  section,	  	  
“Also	  of	  sociological	  interest	  is	  Weber’s	  inclusion	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  an	  
ideological,	  religious	  system	  of	  values	  as	  a	  safeguard	  (‘guarantees’)	  for	  
changes	  in	  the	  social	  structure.”	  (Käsler,	  1988;	  p.	  35).	  	  
	  
The	  formation	  of	  the	  social	  structure,	  and	  more	  specifically	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  
discussion	  of	  the	  sociology	  of	  law,	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  law,	  certainly	  may	  not	  be	  
understood	  from	  this	  perspective	  without	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  dialectical	  relationship	  
it	  shares	  with	  the	  economy.	  However,	  Weber	  does	  not	  fail	  to	  address	  the	  importance	  
of	  ideology	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  law,	  as	  he	  discusses	  the	  effect	  of	  ideology	  on	  
economic	  structures	  and	  changes.	  Specifically,	  the	  next	  section	  will	  discuss	  the	  role	  
of	  religion	  (an	  ideological	  system	  of	  values)	  in	  shaping	  law,	  as	  well	  as	  economy.	  
Depending	  on	  the	  ideological	  focus	  of	  a	  given	  religion,	  it	  may	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  a	  
supplementary	  factor	  in	  facilitating	  the	  rise	  of	  capitalism	  –	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  west	  
–	  or	  conversely,	  may	  in	  fact	  contribute	  to	  the	  preclusion	  of	  a	  society’s	  adoption	  of	  a	  
capitalist	  structure	  –	  as	  in	  various	  cases	  of	  Eastern	  religions.	  	  
	  
Law	  and	  Ideology:	  The	  Indirect	  Ideological	  Foundations	  of	  Law	  
	   This	  section	  will	  discuss	  Weber’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  ideological	  
foundations	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  capitalism.	  This	  section	  therefore	  expands	  its	  sociological	  
explanation	  of	  law	  outside	  the	  realm	  of	  economics.	  Specifically,	  in	  The	  Protestant	  
Ethic	  and	  the	  Spirit	  of	  Capitalism	  (1905),	  Weber	  suggests	  that	  the	  rise	  of	  Western	  
capitalism	  may	  be	  attributed,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  to	  the	  Calvinist	  doctrines	  which	  came	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to	  define	  seventeenth	  century	  American	  Protestant	  Puritans,	  and	  subsequently,	  
what	  Weber	  calls	  the	  ‘The	  Protestant	  Ethic”.	  This	  system	  of	  values,	  which	  was	  
strictly	  adhered	  to	  by	  the	  American	  Puritans,	  is	  argued	  to	  be	  a	  precursor	  to	  the	  “the	  
spirit	  of	  capitalism”.	  The	  economic	  conditions	  of	  prosperity	  in	  the	  new	  world	  
combined	  with	  said	  ‘Sprit	  of	  Capitalism’	  –	  a	  product	  of	  ‘the	  Protestant	  Ethic’	  –	  
facilitated	  the	  rise	  of	  capitalism	  in	  the	  West.	  Therefore,	  this	  section,	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  
dialectical	  perspective	  of	  the	  sociology	  of	  law,	  will	  discuss	  the	  ability	  for	  ideological	  
concepts	  (namely,	  Calvinism	  and	  the	  Protestant	  ethic)	  to	  directly	  effect	  the	  
economic	  structure	  of	  society	  (namely	  the	  inception	  of	  Western	  Capitalism),	  when	  
combined	  with	  adequate	  material	  conditions.	  Subsequently,	  due	  to	  the	  dialectical	  
relationship	  between	  the	  economy	  and	  law,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  the	  
implications	  ideological	  concepts	  have	  on	  the	  shaping	  of	  the	  economic	  structure	  
may	  be	  argued	  to	  be	  also	  responsible	  for	  the	  shaping	  of	  the	  law.	  The	  dialectical	  
nature	  of	  this	  relationship	  necessarily	  suggests	  that	  in	  shaping	  the	  economic	  
structure,	  law	  may	  be	  argued	  to	  indirectly	  determine	  the	  dominant	  ideological	  
values	  of	  the	  given	  society.	  Since	  Weber	  suggests	  a	  dialectical	  relationship	  between	  
ideology	  and	  economic	  structure,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  dialectical	  relationship	  between	  
economic	  structure	  and	  law,	  ideology	  and	  law	  must	  be	  in	  some	  way	  connected.	  
Though	  they	  are	  not	  directly	  related	  to	  one	  another,	  Weber	  argues	  that	  they	  are	  
social	  phenomena	  of	  the	  same	  order,	  or	  same	  standing	  vis	  à	  vis	  the	  economic	  
structure.	  Using	  the	  rise	  of	  western	  capitalism	  as	  the	  primary	  example	  in	  this	  
section,	  it	  will	  be	  argued	  that	  a	  shifting	  economic	  structure	  in	  the	  way	  of	  capitalism	  
suggests	  what	  Weber	  calls	  the	  “rationalization”	  of	  law,	  which	  subsequently	  results	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in	  absolute	  legal	  dominance.	  Through	  the	  use	  of	  this	  example,	  it	  will	  be	  further	  
proven	  that	  a	  shifting	  social-­‐economic	  system	  necessarily	  suggests	  a	  shifting	  legal	  
landscape	  as	  well.	  	  
Weber	  introduces	  the	  concept	  of	  ideology	  (namely	  religious	  doctrines)	  as	  
being	  related	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  Capitalism	  in	  his	  1896	  essay.	  For	  Weber	  though,	  ideology	  
was	  not	  seen	  as	  primarily	  responsible	  for	  the	  rise	  of	  capitalism	  –	  and	  therefore	  
capitalist-­‐style	  law	  (increasingly	  rational)	  –	  furthermore,	  ideological,	  or	  religious	  
value	  systems	  were	  seen	  as	  ‘guarantees’	  for	  changes	  in	  social	  structure,	  which	  in	  
combination	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  economic	  capitalist	  institutions,	  facilitated	  large-­‐scale	  
structural	  change,	  	  
	   “Not	  until	  the	  city	  had	  been	  resurrected	  in	  the	  Middle	  Ages	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  	  
free	  labour	  and	  trade,	  when	  the	  transition	  to	  political	  economy	  paved	  the	  
way	  for	  bourgeois	  freedom…	  only	  then	  did	  the	  old	  giant	  rise	  up	  with	  
renewed	  strength	  and	  lift	  the	  spiritual	  legacy	  of	  antiquity	  up	  to	  the	  light	  of	  
modern,	  bourgeois	  civilization”	  (Qtd.	  in:	  Kasler,	  1988:	  p.	  35).	  	  
	  
While	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  roman	  city,	  and	  the	  move	  to	  a	  rural	  civilization	  has	  been	  
argued	  to	  be	  related	  to	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  ancient	  economic	  system	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  
feudalism,	  religious	  ideology	  –	  ‘the	  old	  giant’	  –	  is	  argued	  here	  to	  be	  reciprocally	  
related	  to	  re-­‐urbanization	  in	  the	  Middle	  Ages,	  and	  therefore	  the	  rise	  of	  modern	  
capitalism	  as	  well	  as	  the	  legal	  institutions	  that	  it	  implies.	  Ideology,	  specifically	  that	  
which	  is	  tied	  to	  religion,	  is	  therefore	  fundamentally	  linked	  to	  social	  change.	  The	  rise	  
of	  capitalism,	  being	  a	  socio-­‐economic	  system	  that	  includes	  particular	  legal	  
structures,	  is	  considered	  by	  Weber	  to	  be	  caused	  by	  the	  social	  adoption	  of	  particular	  
religious	  ideologies.	  Economic,	  political,	  and	  legal	  ideology	  for	  Weber,	  are	  all	  share	  a	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reciprocal	  relationship	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  capitalism.,	  as	  discussed	  in	  a	  more	  developed	  
way	  in	  The	  Protestant	  Ethic	  and	  the	  Spirit	  of	  Capitalism	  (1904-­‐1905).	  	  
Before	  discussing	  this	  work	  in	  more	  detail,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  establish	  that,	  
“Weber	  never	  meant	  to	  substitute	  ideology	  for	  material	  and	  economic	  factors	  in	  his	  
explanation	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  capitalism	  and	  theory	  of	  social	  change”	  (Tastsoglou,	  2015:	  
p.	  17).	  The	  dialectical	  sociology	  of	  law,	  though	  it	  does	  have	  an	  ideological	  aspect,	  as	  
will	  be	  discussed	  here,	  largely	  tends	  to	  focus	  of	  the	  material	  economic	  conditions	  of	  
society	  as	  determinants	  of	  law	  through	  the	  dialectical	  relationship	  that	  has	  been	  
described	  so	  far.	  Similarly	  to	  the	  conflict	  approach,	  specifically	  the	  semi-­‐
autonomous	  perspective,	  social	  factors	  outside	  economics	  are	  not	  discounted,	  but	  
should	  not	  be	  considered	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  discussion.	  In	  fact,	  it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  
Weber’s	  ideological	  understanding	  of	  social	  change,	  as	  presented	  in	  The	  Protestant	  
Ethic	  and	  the	  Spirit	  of	  Capitalism	  (1904-­‐1905)	  is	  a	  direct	  answer	  to	  Marx’s	  economic	  
determinism.	  While	  Marx’s	  theory	  (specifically,	  the	  deterministic	  perspective)	  
focuses	  solely	  on	  material	  economic	  conditions	  as	  determining	  social	  change	  Weber	  
(1904-­‐1905)	  suggests	  the	  importance	  of	  ideology.	  Therefore,	  the	  two	  theorists	  –	  one	  
being	  purely	  positivistic	  and	  the	  other	  advocating	  for	  the	  importance	  of	  ideology	  –	  
have	  often	  been	  taken	  to	  contradict	  one	  another	  in	  this	  way	  (Birnbaum,	  1953).	  It	  is	  
argued	  here,	  that	  despite	  the	  ideological	  nature	  of	  this	  work	  being	  contradictory	  to	  
the	  traditional	  Marxist	  understanding	  of	  social	  change,	  the	  semi-­‐autonomous	  
perspective	  within	  the	  conflict	  approach	  might	  suggest	  that	  the	  multi-­‐dimensional	  
theories	  of	  the	  two	  are	  not	  necessarily	  contradictory,	  but	  rather,	  may	  be	  considered	  
to	  be	  in	  some	  way,	  complementary.	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   In	  order	  to	  discuss	  Weber’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  ideological	  foundations	  of	  
the	  rise	  of	  capitalism	  –	  this	  time,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  western	  world	  –	  a	  short	  summary	  
of	  the	  central	  argument	  of	  The	  Protestant	  Ethic	  and	  the	  Spirit	  of	  Capitalism	  (1904-­‐
1905)	  will	  be	  given	  here.	  The	  basis	  of	  the	  work	  is:	  separate	  from	  the	  capitalist	  
material	  economic	  conditions	  which	  he	  argued	  to	  have	  been	  largely	  responsible	  for	  
the	  fall	  of	  the	  Roman	  Empire	  as	  discussed	  previously,	  religious	  ideology	  may	  itself	  
be	  a	  force	  which	  can	  facilitate	  the	  rise	  of	  capitalism	  as	  an	  economic	  structure.	  
Calvinism	  –	  the	  notion	  that	  strong	  work	  ethic	  and	  abstinence	  from	  worldly	  
pleasures	  results	  in	  other	  worldly	  gratification	  –	  came	  to	  define	  the	  ‘protestant	  
ethic’.	  Furthermore,	  Calvinist	  doctrines,	  according	  to	  Weber,	  became	  the	  dominant	  
religious-­‐based	  ideological	  value	  system	  of	  the	  American	  Puritans.	  Weber	  called	  this	  
concept	  “this-­‐worldly	  asceticism”.	  The	  combination	  of	  the	  material	  economic	  
conditions	  experienced	  by	  the	  puritans	  and	  the	  “this-­‐worldly	  asceticism”	  they	  had	  
adopted	  as	  an	  ideological	  foundation	  of	  the	  “protestant	  ethic”,	  gave	  rise	  to	  what	  
Weber	  calls	  “the	  spirit	  of	  capitalism”,	  which	  inevitably	  gave	  rise	  to	  modern	  
capitalism	  itself	  as	  an	  economic	  structure.	  In	  this	  way,	  ideology,	  more	  specifically	  
religious	  ideology,	  may	  be	  considered	  a	  supplementary	  factor	  in	  determining	  the	  
rise	  of	  capitalism	  (supplementary,	  of	  course	  to	  the	  economic	  conditions	  which	  
facilitate	  social	  change).	  	  
When	  comparing	  the	  “this-­‐worldly	  asceticism”	  of	  the	  protestant	  ethic	  to	  
“other-­‐worldly	  asceticism”	  of	  other	  religions,	  Weber	  suggested	  that	  the	  Protestant	  
focus	  on	  the	  material	  world,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  spiritual	  basis	  of	  other	  traditional	  
Eastern	  religions	  supplemented	  the	  rise	  of	  capitalism	  (though	  it	  is	  likely	  that	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capitalism	  could	  still	  have	  existed	  regardless	  of	  religious	  ideology).	  Hinduism	  of	  
India,	  for	  example,	  which	  placed	  a	  great	  amount	  of	  emphasis	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  
reincarnation	  (other-­‐worldly	  asceticism),	  did	  not	  facilitate	  the	  rise	  of	  capitalism,	  
despite	  economic	  conditions	  that	  were	  deemed	  capable	  of	  facilitating	  similar	  socio-­‐
economic	  change	  to	  that	  experienced	  in	  the	  West.	  Weber	  therefore	  argues,	  in	  
summation,	  that	  the	  combination	  of	  ‘this	  worldly	  asceticism’	  with	  material	  economic	  
conditions	  facilitates	  the	  rise	  of	  a	  capitalist	  system.	  The	  presence	  of	  the	  former,	  
however,	  does	  not	  necessarily	  suggest	  the	  inevitable	  rise	  of	  capitalism	  without	  the	  
presence	  of	  the	  latter,	  and	  the	  same	  may	  be	  said	  in	  reverse.	  It	  was	  the	  combination	  
of	  ideology	  and	  material	  conditions	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  modern	  capitalism	  in	  the	  west,	  
in	  a	  very	  particular	  social,	  cultural,	  and	  economic	  context.	  Furthermore,	  Weber	  
suggests	  a	  reciprocal	  relationship	  between	  Calvinist	  ideology	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  modern	  
capitalism	  –	  described	  as	  a	  relationship	  of	  ‘elective	  affinity	  –	  similarly	  to	  his	  more	  
broad	  explanation	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  economy	  and	  law.	  	  
The	  question	  remains:	  how	  exactly	  does	  the	  protestant	  ethic	  –	  defined	  by	  the	  
Calvinist	  notion	  of	  predestination	  –	  facilitate	  the	  rise	  of	  capitalism?	  Weber	  explains	  
the	  affinity	  between	  Calvinism	  and	  the	  spirit	  of	  capitalism	  through	  his	  notion	  of	  
rationality,	  “Modern	  capitalism	  is	  a	  great	  complex	  of	  interrelated	  institutions	  based	  
on	  rational	  rather	  than	  speculative	  types	  of	  economic	  pursuit”	  (Bendix,	  1977:	  p.	  53-­‐
54).	  Further,	  the	  worldly	  asceticism	  of	  the	  protestant	  ethic,	  which	  promotes	  the	  
ideal	  that	  hard	  work	  in	  life	  will	  result	  in	  gratification	  in	  the	  afterlife,	  tends	  to	  
support	  the	  fundamental	  basis	  of	  capitalism	  –	  the	  absolute	  pursuit	  of	  economic	  
profit	  and	  growth.	  Weber	  does	  not	  suggest	  that	  the	  goal	  of	  Protestant	  reformation	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was	  to	  promote	  capitalist	  growth,	  but	  rather,	  that	  the	  two	  share	  a	  particular	  affinity	  
toward	  one	  another.	  There	  is	  a	  necessary	  reciprocal,	  though	  unintentional,	  
relationship	  between	  Calvinism,	  the	  protestant	  ethic,	  and	  the	  spirit	  of	  capitalism.	  	  
“None	  of	  the	  great	  [Protestant]	  Reformers	  had	  any	  thought	  of	  promoting	  ‘the	  
spirit	  of	  capitalism’	  but	  Weber	  hoped	  to	  show	  that	  their	  doctrines	  
nevertheless	  contained	  implicit	  incentives	  in	  this	  direction	  –	  especially	  the	  
Calvinist	  doctrine	  of	  predestination…”	  (Bendix,	  1977:	  p.	  58).	  	  
	  
For	  the	  Puritans,	  strictly	  abiding	  by	  the	  teachings	  of	  John	  Calvin,	  ‘work’	  in	  a	  purely	  
worldly	  and	  material	  sense,	  was	  not	  seen	  as	  the	  pursuit	  of	  profit,	  but	  rather,	  as	  
service	  to	  God.	  The	  economic	  prosperity	  that	  resulted	  from	  hard	  work	  was	  not	  
viewed	  as	  the	  result	  of	  hard	  work,	  but	  rather	  as	  God’s	  worldly	  reward	  for	  the	  
individual’s	  fulfillment	  of	  his	  or	  her	  duty.	  Regardless	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  hard	  
work	  of	  the	  Puritans,	  it	  resulted	  in	  a	  thriving	  economic	  environment,	  giving	  rise	  to	  
both	  ‘the	  spirit	  of	  capitalism’	  and	  subsequently,	  the	  rise	  of	  capitalism	  itself.	  
Undoubtedly,	  Weber	  holds	  that	  the	  rise	  of	  capitalism	  in	  the	  west	  was	  largely	  the	  
result	  of	  specific	  material/economic	  conditions,	  without	  which,	  capitalism	  would	  
not	  have	  come	  to	  fruition.	  However,	  as	  explained	  here	  the	  ideological/religious	  
doctrines	  as	  seen	  in	  the	  Puritans	  through	  their	  adoption	  of	  Calvinism	  should	  also	  be	  
seen	  as	  relevant	  in	  the	  discussion.	  	  
	   The	  rise	  of	  capitalism	  in	  the	  West	  –	  attributed	  to	  the	  dialectical	  relationship	  
between	  economy	  and	  law,	  and	  as	  presented	  in	  the	  Protestant	  Ethic	  and	  the	  Spirit	  of	  
Capitalism,	  Weber’s	  openness	  to	  discuss	  ideology	  as	  a	  contributor	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  
capitalism	  (law,	  here	  argued	  to	  be	  a	  specific	  form	  of	  ideology)	  –	  suggests	  a	  societal	  
shift	  toward	  rationalization;	  that	  is,	  a	  characteristic	  of	  modern	  life,	  similarly	  to	  the	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socio-­‐economic	  system	  of	  capitalism	  itself.	  Rationalization	  may	  certainly	  be	  seen	  in	  
the	  ideological	  framework	  of	  the	  Puritans	  (namely	  the	  this-­‐worldly	  asceticism	  of	  the	  
Calvinist	  Protestant	  ethic),	  as	  it	  was	  their	  religious	  beliefs	  that	  promoted	  extensive	  
labor,	  and	  therefore	  proficient	  economic	  production.	  This	  ideological	  value	  is	  indeed	  
one	  that	  facilitates	  the	  rise	  of	  capitalism.	  Subsequently,	  with	  increased	  rationality	  in	  
modernity,	  law	  tends	  to	  see	  a	  shift	  toward	  rationality	  as	  well.	  Specifically,	  Weber	  
suggests	  that	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  capitalism,	  and	  subsequently	  the	  rise	  of	  a	  newly	  
economically	  powerful	  bourgeois	  class,	  a	  move	  to	  legal	  rationality	  was	  inevitable.	  A	  
formal	  and	  predictable	  legal	  system	  exists	  under	  capitalism	  because	  it	  is	  in	  the	  best	  
interest	  of	  the	  economically	  powerful	  as	  well	  as	  the	  political	  powerful.	  As	  discussed	  
in	  Marx’s	  conflict	  approach,	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  structure	  of	  capitalism	  implies	  
extreme	  class	  antagonism	  between	  the	  opposing	  classes.	  Legal	  rationality	  for	  Weber	  
is	  therefore	  a	  product	  of	  capitalism	  –	  as	  it	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  maintaining	  
bourgeois	  dominance	  –	  however,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  ideological	  foundations	  of	  
rationality	  in	  society	  in	  general,	  as	  discussed	  here	  through	  the	  example	  of	  the	  
Puritans,	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  precursor,	  and	  therefore	  a	  determinant	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  
capitalism.	  Since	  the	  rationality	  of	  the	  Protestant	  ethic	  suggests	  legal	  rationality	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  maximization	  of	  economic	  production,	  it	  necessarily	  produces	  the	  
economic	  structure	  of	  capitalism.	  Ideology	  and	  economy,	  from	  the	  dialectical	  
perspective	  are	  seen	  as	  having	  a	  reciprocal	  relationship	  with	  one	  another;	  further,	  
as	  it	  is	  argued	  here	  that	  law	  is	  indeed	  a	  form	  of	  ideology,	  law	  and	  economy	  may	  be	  
said	  to	  be	  related.	  Ideological	  values	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  rationality	  in	  society	  have	  the	  
capacity	  to	  shape	  law,	  as	  well	  as	  influence	  the	  rise	  of	  capitalism.	  Conversely,	  the	  rise	  
	  
40	  
of	  capitalism,	  and	  the	  subsequent	  increase	  in	  class	  antagonism,	  indeed	  hold	  the	  
capacity	  to	  shape	  law	  (encouraging	  increased	  legal	  rationality)	  and	  therefore	  shape	  
ideology	  as	  well.	  	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  	  
	   The	  Weberian	  sociology	  of	  law	  has	  examined	  the	  relationship	  between	  
economics,	  ideology	  (religious	  ideology,	  specifically),	  and	  law.	  Specifically,	  the	  
dialectical	  perspective	  holds	  that	  matters	  of	  economics	  and	  those	  of	  ideology	  stand	  
together	  in	  a	  reciprocal	  relationship	  with	  the	  economy.	  Like	  Marx,	  Weber	  suggests	  
that	  economy	  is	  the	  key	  contributor	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  law;	  however,	  ideological	  
values	  –	  like	  those	  of	  the	  Puritans,	  which	  facilitated	  the	  rise	  of	  capitalism	  –	  are	  not	  to	  
be	  overlooked.	  Using	  the	  examples	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  capitalism	  out	  of	  ancient	  Rome,	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  example	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  capitalism	  in	  the	  West,	  Weber’s	  dialectical	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  law-­‐economy	  relationship	  and	  his	  entire	  sociology	  of	  law,	  as	  
examined	  here,	  was	  a	  positivist	  discussion,	  situated	  in	  a	  particular	  historical	  context	  
like	  that	  of	  his	  predecessor,	  Karl	  Marx.	  Additionally,	  Weber’s	  sociology	  of	  law	  is	  also	  
rooted	  in	  the	  conflict	  tradition	  and	  therefore,	  further	  similarities	  may	  be	  drawn	  










The	  Functionalist	  Approach:	  	  Emile	  Durkheim’s	  Sociology	  of	  Law	  
	  
The	  third	  and	  final	  approach	  to	  the	  sociology	  of	  law	  that	  will	  be	  discussed	  
will	  be	  Emile	  Durkheim’s	  functionalist	  approach.	  Here,	  through	  various	  works	  of	  
Emile	  Durkheim,	  concepts	  of	  ‘law’	  and	  ‘crime’	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  role	  
in	  society;	  furthermore,	  the	  discussion	  around	  both	  of	  these	  concepts	  will	  be	  
discussed	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘punishment’.	  All	  social	  phenomena,	  
whether	  deemed	  innately	  ‘good’	  (i.e.	  law)	  or	  ‘bad’	  (i.e.	  crime),	  from	  the	  functionalist	  
perspective,	  contribute	  something	  of	  significance	  to	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	  Wilkinson	  
(1981)	  cites	  Durkheim	  who	  compares	  society	  to	  a	  living	  organism,	  using	  what	  is	  
referred	  to	  as	  the	  biological	  analogy,	  	  
“Not	  far	  below	  the	  surface	  of	  functionalism	  and	  undoubtedly	  of	  historical	  
significance	  has	  been	  the	  biological	  analogy	  of	  social	  systems	  as	  organisms.	  
Organisms	  as	  bounded	  entities	  composed	  of	  interdependent	  parts	  can	  be	  
analyzed	  for	  the	  contribution	  each	  part	  plays	  in	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  
whole”	  (Podgorecki	  &	  Whelan,	  ed.	  1981.	  Pg.	  67-­‐68)	  
	  
Law	  and	  crime	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  contributors	  to	  the	  maintenance	  of	  society,	  as	  
an	  organism.	  For	  Durkheim,	  law	  (and	  the	  sanctions	  that	  it	  imposes)	  can	  be	  viewed	  
as	  a	  means	  of	  maintaining	  social	  solidarity,	  and	  thus	  maintaining	  the	  society	  as	  a	  
whole.	  Contrastingly,	  crime	  –	  though	  often	  devalued	  as	  a	  social	  phenomenon	  –	  for	  
Durkheim	  serves	  a	  necessary	  function	  in	  society	  as	  well.	  Crime	  is	  a	  normative	  aspect	  




“The	  boundaries	  of	  society	  have	  to	  be	  maintained	  and	  identified	  [unlike	  the	  
aforementioned	  biological	  organism]	  and	  it	  is	  for	  this	  function	  that	  the	  
normality	  of	  crime	  provides”	  (Podgorecki	  &	  Whelan,	  ed.	  1981.	  Pg.	  70).	  	  
	  
Without	  crime,	  and	  law,	  which	  seeks	  to	  define	  ‘crime’	  as	  such,	  Durkheim	  contends	  
that	  social	  solidarity	  would	  be	  negatively	  impacted,	  contributing	  to	  the	  development	  
of	  an	  anomic	  state.	  Hence,	  from	  the	  functionalist	  approach	  in	  the	  sociology	  of	  law,	  
both	  law	  and	  crime	  must	  be	  discussed	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  role	  they	  each	  play	  in	  the	  
maintenance	  of	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  
In	  the	  preceding	  chapters	  (Marx’s	  and	  Weber’s	  approaches),	  law	  was	  
discussed	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  relation	  to	  the	  economy.	  From	  those	  approaches,	  the	  
economy,	  that	  is	  the	  means	  by	  which	  individuals	  sustain	  and	  reproduce	  themselves,	  
is	  seen	  as	  the	  fundamental	  and	  central	  core	  of	  social	  life.	  While	  Durkheim	  discusses	  
neither	  political	  economy	  in	  particular,	  nor	  the	  relationship	  it	  shares	  with	  law,	  he	  
seeks	  to	  address	  the	  relationship	  between	  law	  (and	  crime)	  and	  society,	  more	  
broadly.	  All	  three	  approaches	  to	  the	  sociology	  of	  law	  are	  indeed	  discussions	  of	  the	  
relationship	  between	  law	  and	  society.	  The	  former	  two	  approaches	  	  (Marx	  and	  
Weber)	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  a	  key	  component	  of	  society	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  law	  (political	  
economy)	  and	  the	  functionalist	  approach,	  as	  discussed	  here,	  discusses	  society	  as	  a	  
whole	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  the	  law.	  Moreover,	  all	  three	  seek	  to	  discuss	  society	  and	  law,	  
just	  in	  somewhat	  different	  ways.	  Therefore,	  there	  are,	  of	  course,	  differences	  
between	  the	  three	  (most	  significantly	  between	  the	  former	  two	  and	  this	  one),	  but	  
there	  are	  also	  similarities,	  which	  should	  not	  be	  discounted.	  	  
This	  chapter	  will	  begin	  by	  discussing	  Durkheim’s	  conception	  of	  law	  and	  its	  
relationship	  to	  society,	  specifically	  as	  it	  correlates	  to	  his	  two	  types	  of	  social	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solidarity,	  as	  discussed	  at	  length	  in	  The	  Division	  of	  Labour	  in	  Society	  (1839).	  
Secondly,	  the	  discussion	  will	  move	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  crime,	  which	  ought	  to	  be	  
discussed	  separately,	  as	  it	  has	  a	  unique	  contribution	  to	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	  Lastly,	  the	  
concept	  of	  anomie	  will	  be	  discussed.	  Here,	  the	  question	  of	  what	  society	  might	  look	  
like	  without	  law	  will	  be	  addressed.	  In	  discussing	  Suicide	  (1897)	  in	  particular,	  issues	  
of	  law	  and	  deviance	  will	  be	  discussed	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  anomie.	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
Law	  and	  Society:	  Correlating	  a	  Binary	  Legal	  Framework	  with	  the	  Two	  Types	  of	  Social	  
Solidarity	  	  	   	  
To	  begin	  this	  discussion	  of	  the	  functionalist	  approach	  to	  the	  sociology	  of	  law	  
–	  that	  is,	  the	  Durkheimian	  sociology	  of	  law	  –	  The	  Division	  of	  Labour	  in	  Society	  (1893)	  
will	  be	  analyzed,	  specifically	  centered	  on	  its	  discussion	  of	  the	  role	  of	  law	  in	  society.	  
This	  particular	  work	  –	  being	  Durkheim’s	  largest	  and	  most	  comprehensive	  
discussion	  of	  social	  theory	  –	  discusses	  at	  some	  length,	  concepts	  of	  social	  solidarity,	  
(i.e.	  the	  conscience	  collective),	  and	  most	  importantly	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  
discussion,	  law,	  crime,	  and	  punishment,	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  aforementioned	  
Durkheimian	  theoretical	  concept	  of	  social	  solidarity.	  As	  will	  be	  seen,	  the	  key	  to	  the	  
Durkheimian	  understanding	  of	  law	  is	  the	  fundamental	  relationship	  law	  	  shares	  with	  
the	  type	  of	  social	  solidarity	  that	  exists	  in	  a	  given	  society.	  At	  the	  root	  of	  Durkheim’s	  
discussion	  lies	  the	  question	  of	  how	  exactly	  the	  division	  of	  labour	  in	  a	  given	  society	  
(in	  terms	  of	  its	  complexity)	  is	  related	  to	  the	  social	  solidarity	  of	  that	  society.	  Further,	  	  
“…	  There	  exists	  a	  social	  solidarity	  arising	  from	  the	  division	  of	  labour.	  This	  is	  a	  
self-­‐evident	  truth	  since	  in	  [industrialized,	  contemporary	  societies],	  the	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division	  of	  labour	  is	  highly	  developed	  and	  it	  engenders	  solidarity”	  (qtd	  in:	  
Calhoun	  et.	  al.,	  2012:	  p.	  221)	  
	  
Therefore,	  for	  Durkheim,	  in	  a	  society	  defined	  by	  a	  complex	  division	  of	  labour	  such	  as	  
the	  relatively	  modernized	  and	  industrialized	  society	  that	  he	  observed,	  social	  
solidarity	  necessarily	  exists.	  A	  task	  that	  was	  once	  completed	  by	  few	  workers	  was	  
now	  divided	  among	  many,	  thus	  creating	  inter-­‐worker	  dependency,	  and	  
subsequently,	  social	  solidarity.	  In	  a	  society	  defined	  by	  a	  complex	  and	  highly	  
developed	  division	  of	  labour,	  wherein	  each	  individual	  worker	  fulfills	  a	  task	  that	  is	  
highly	  specialized,	  and	  differentiated	  from	  his	  or	  her	  colleagues,	  social	  solidarity	  
(namely	  of	  the	  organic	  variety)	  necessarily	  exists.	  Through	  each	  individual’s	  
specialized	  job,	  which	  contributes	  to	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  greater	  task,	  the	  workers	  
become	  dependent	  on	  one	  another,	  thus	  creating	  a	  sense	  of	  solidarity.	  Contrastingly,	  
in	  a	  society	  defined	  by	  a	  less	  developed	  division	  of	  labour,	  wherein	  the	  individual	  
workers	  carry	  out	  tasks	  that	  are	  unspecialized,	  and	  therefore	  all	  individuals	  are	  
quite	  similar,	  solidarity	  (of	  the	  mechanical	  variety)	  exists	  as	  a	  result	  of	  said	  lack	  of	  
uniqueness	  amongst	  the	  workers.	  Mechanical	  solidarity	  is	  therefore	  solidarity	  of	  
similarity,	  while	  organic	  solidarity	  is	  solidarity	  of	  difference.	  
	  Though	  Durkheim	  argues	  that	  where	  you	  find	  organic	  solidarity,	  there	  will	  
also	  exist	  a	  complex	  division	  of	  labour,	  the	  question	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  relationship	  
remains.	  	  
“To	  state	  the	  position	  precisely,	  at	  the	  point	  we	  have	  now	  reached	  it	  is	  not	  
easy	  to	  say	  whether	  it	  is	  social	  solidarity	  that	  produces	  these	  phenomena	  
[complex	  division	  of	  labour;	  interdependence],	  or,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  whether	  




As	  the	  concept	  of	  social	  solidarity	  is	  “…	  a	  wholly	  moral	  phenomenon	  which	  by	  itself	  
is	  not	  amenable	  to	  exact	  observation,	  and	  especially	  not	  to	  measurement”	  (qtd	  in:	  
Calhoun	  et.	  al.,	  2012:	  p.	  221)	  and	  may	  therefore	  not	  be	  used	  in	  isolation	  to	  explain	  
the	  nature	  of	  the	  relationship	  it	  shares	  with	  social	  bonds	  and	  interdependence	  (and	  
the	  division	  of	  labour).	  Rather,	  Durkheim	  suggests	  that	  an	  external	  social	  fact	  must	  
be	  drawn	  upon	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  this	  concept.	  That	  external	  social	  fact,	  among	  
some	  less	  significant	  others,	  is	  law.	  For	  Durkheim,	  law	  –	  being	  the	  fundamental	  
mode	  of	  organization	  of	  social	  life,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  external	  manifestation	  of	  
Durkheim’s	  conscience	  collective	  (Durkheim,	  1893)	  –	  is	  a	  means	  of	  measuring	  social	  
solidarity,	  and	  additionally	  a	  means	  of	  understanding	  the	  two	  types	  of	  social	  
solidarity,	  as	  they	  correlate	  with	  two	  types	  of	  law.	  	  
	   The	  functionalist	  sociology	  of	  law	  therefore	  revolves	  around	  the	  relationship	  
law	  shares	  with	  the	  social	  solidarity	  of	  the	  society	  in	  which	  it	  exists.	  A	  common	  way	  
to	  differentiate	  between	  various	  types	  of	  law	  is	  to	  categorize	  law	  as	  either	  ‘public’	  or	  
‘private’.	  While	  the	  former	  focuses	  on	  the	  legal	  relationship	  between	  the	  individual	  
and	  the	  state,	  the	  latter	  focuses	  on	  legal	  relationships	  between	  individuals.	  
Durkheim	  contends,	  however,	  that	  this	  distinction	  is	  not	  useful.	  	  
“…	  When	  we	  attempt	  to	  define	  these	  terms	  closely,	  the	  dividing	  line,	  which	  
appeared	  at	  first	  sight	  to	  be	  so	  clear-­‐cut,	  disappears.	  All	  law	  is	  private	  in	  the	  
sense	  that	  always	  and	  everywhere	  individuals	  are	  concerned	  and	  are	  its	  
actors.	  Above	  all,	  however,	  all	  law	  is	  public,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  is	  a	  social	  
function”	  (qtd.	  in:	  Calhoun	  et.	  al.,	  2012:	  p.	  224).	  	  
	  
Indeed,	  the	  distinction	  between	  public	  and	  private	  law	  is	  not	  worthwhile,	  since	  at	  
their	  core,	  there	  is	  no	  difference	  between	  the	  two.	  Durkheim	  sought	  to	  create	  a	  new	  
distinction	  that	  might	  facilitate	  his	  discussion	  of	  how	  different	  legal	  frameworks	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correlate	  with	  different	  types	  of	  social	  solidarity,	  in	  lieu	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  public	  
versus	  private	  distinction	  has	  proven	  to	  be	  useless.	  	  
	   Since	  legal	  precepts	  may	  be	  defined	  as	  a	  socially	  constructed	  behavior	  that	  
hold	  socially	  defined	  sanctions;	  and	  further,	  these	  sanctions	  vary	  depending	  on	  the	  
seriousness	  of	  the	  behavior,	  now	  defined	  as	  crime,	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  this	  
‘crime’	  disrupts	  or	  conflicts	  with	  the	  conscience	  collective	  (a	  unanimously	  accepted	  
set	  of	  moral	  values	  in	  society),	  differentiating	  between	  types	  of	  law	  ought	  to	  be	  done	  
based	  on	  the	  sanctions,	  or	  punishments	  which	  they	  impose.	  Rather	  than	  
categorizing	  law	  typologies	  based	  on	  their	  purpose	  or	  by	  whom	  they	  are	  intended	  to	  
address,	  Durkheim	  differentiates	  between	  types	  of	  law	  based	  on	  the	  type	  of	  
punishment	  they	  tend	  to	  favor.	  Law	  may	  therefore	  not	  be	  discussed	  from	  the	  
functionalist	  approach	  without	  including	  a	  discussion	  of	  punishment.	  	  
	   There	  are	  therefore	  two	  types	  of	  law	  according	  to	  Durkheim.	  Firstly	  there	  are	  
those	  that	  impose	  repressive,	  organized	  sanctions,	  which	  seek	  to	  inflict	  suffering	  or	  
punishment	  on	  the	  convicted.	  Secondly,	  there	  are	  those	  that	  do	  not	  seek	  to	  punish	  
the	  perpetrator	  by	  imposing	  suffering	  on	  them,	  but	  rather,	  they	  seek	  to	  restore	  the	  
previous	  state	  of	  affairs	  by	  restoring	  social	  relationships	  to	  their	  original	  form,	  thus	  
retaining	  social	  solidarity.	  In	  contemporary	  terms	  these	  two	  law	  typologies	  may	  be	  
loosely	  defined	  as	  retributive	  versus	  restorative	  justice,	  respectively.	  As	  will	  be	  
discussed,	  these	  two	  types	  of	  law,	  based	  on	  the	  types	  of	  sanctions	  they	  impose,	  will	  
be	  discussed	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  they	  correlate	  with	  the	  two	  types	  of	  social	  solidarity;	  
mechanical,	  and	  organic.	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  functionalist	  sociology	  of	  law	  may	  be	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understood	  by	  suggesting	  that	  the	  formation	  of	  law	  entirely	  depends	  on	  the	  degree	  
(and	  type)	  of	  social	  solidarity	  that	  exists	  in	  the	  society	  that	  is	  governed	  by	  said	  law.	  	  
Furthermore,	  law	  may	  be	  said	  to	  be	  not	  only	  a	  reflection	  of	  social	  solidarity,	  
but	  may	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  external	  manifestation	  of	  the	  conscience	  collective,	  as	  it	  
is	  this	  that	  is	  argued	  to	  define	  the	  specifics	  of	  law	  and	  criminality,	  “Thus,	  we	  may	  
state	  that	  an	  act	  is	  criminal	  when	  it	  offends	  the	  strong,	  well-­‐defined	  states	  of	  the	  
collective	  consciousness”	  (qtd	  in:	  Calhoun	  et.	  al.,	  2012:	  p.	  225).	  	  Because	  law	  is	  
defined	  by	  a	  socially	  accepted	  set	  of	  intrinsic	  moral	  values,	  common	  to	  all	  members	  
of	  society,	  which	  Durkheim	  terms	  ‘the	  collective	  (or	  common)	  consciousness’,	  law	  is	  
subjective	  in	  nature.	  Actions	  are	  not	  inherently	  criminal;	  rather,	  they	  are	  socially	  
defined	  as	  such.	  	  
“In	  other	  words,	  we	  should	  not	  say	  an	  act	  offends	  the	  common	  consciousness	  
because	  it	  is	  criminal,	  but	  it	  is	  criminal	  because	  it	  offends	  that	  consciousness.	  
We	  do	  not	  condemn	  it	  because	  it	  is	  a	  crime,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  crime	  because	  we	  
condemn	  it”	  (qtd	  in:	  Calhoun	  et.	  al.,	  2012:	  p.	  226).	  	  
	  
Like	  the	  previously	  discussed	  theorists,	  Durkheim	  maintains	  the	  notion	  that	  law	  is	  a	  
social	  phenomenon,	  and	  further,	  criminality	  only	  exists	  within	  a	  social	  context.	  In	  
summation,	  the	  functionalist	  sociology	  of	  law	  firstly	  seeks	  to	  establish	  a	  conceptual	  
relationship	  between	  law	  and	  social	  solidarity.	  It	  states	  that	  law	  is	  socially	  defined	  
and	  is	  therefore	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  collective	  consciousness.	  The	  latter	  is	  especially	  
true	  in	  the	  case	  of	  mechanical	  solidarity,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  at	  some	  length.	  





Repressive	  Law	  and	  Mechanical	  Solidarity	  
	   As	  introduced	  above,	  mechanical	  solidarity	  –	  which	  arises	  from	  a	  simple	  
division	  of	  labour	  in	  society,	  and	  thus	  a	  lack	  of	  individuality	  of	  the	  members	  of	  
society	  –	  suggests	  a	  prevalent,	  rigid,	  and	  strictly	  defined	  collective	  consciousness.	  
The	  similarities	  of	  the	  workers,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  specialized	  labour	  
subsequently	  suggests	  a	  prevalent	  collective	  consciousness	  (Durkheim,	  1893).	  Law	  
then,	  specifically	  the	  sanctions	  that	  it	  imposes,	  are	  emotionally	  charged	  and	  seek	  to	  
impose	  suffering	  on	  the	  perpetrator	  through	  vengeance	  (Lukes	  &	  Scull,	  1983).	  In	  
doing	  so,	  law	  ostensibly	  restores	  a	  sense	  of	  solidarity	  –	  mechanical	  solidarity,	  
specifically	  –	  by	  denouncing	  any	  act	  that	  contradicts	  the	  rigidly	  defined	  collective	  
values	  of	  society	  through	  penal	  sanctions.	  Repressive	  law	  is	  therefore,	  “…	  a	  result	  of	  
the	  most	  vital	  social	  similarities,	  and	  its	  effect	  is	  to	  maintain	  the	  social	  cohesion	  that	  
arises	  from	  these	  similarities”	  (qtd	  in:	  Calhoun	  et.	  al.,	  2012:	  p.	  227).	  Mechanical	  
solidarity	  is	  necessarily	  correlated	  with	  penal,	  or	  repressive	  law,	  a	  type	  of	  law	  that	  
protects	  this	  type	  of	  solidarity.	  	  
“…	  It	  does	  this	  by	  insisting	  upon	  a	  minimum	  number	  of	  similarities	  from	  each	  
one	  of	  us,	  without	  which	  the	  individual	  would	  be	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  
body	  social,	  and	  by	  enforcing	  the	  respect	  for	  the	  symbol	  which	  expresses	  and	  
epitomizes	  these	  resemblances	  [legal	  codes,	  and	  the	  collective	  
consciousness],	  whilst	  simultaneously	  guaranteeing	  them”	  (qtd	  in:	  Calhoun	  
et.	  al.,	  2012:	  p.	  227).	  	  	  
	  
Indeed,	  a	  society	  that	  is	  defined	  by	  a	  minimally	  developed	  division	  of	  labour,	  thus	  
having	  a	  well-­‐defined	  collective	  consciousness,	  uses	  law	  (and	  punishment)	  as	  a	  
weapon	  to	  sustain	  this	  solidarity,	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  anomie	  (a	  concept	  which	  will	  
be	  discussed	  later).	  Durkheim	  has	  criticized	  this	  type	  of	  law	  –a	  result	  of	  mechanical	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solidarity	  –	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  tends	  to	  perpetuate	  laws	  that	  seek	  to	  punish	  acts	  
that	  are	  not	  detrimental	  to	  society.	  In	  many	  cases,	  laws	  exist	  as	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  
collective	  consciousness	  (notably	  those	  laws	  deriving	  from	  religious	  values).	  
Durkheim	  suggests	  that	  penal	  law	  tends	  to	  support	  these	  laws	  (which	  criminalize	  
acts	  that	  have	  no	  negative	  impact	  on	  society),	  despite	  their	  irrationality,	  on	  the	  basis	  
of	  maintaining	  social	  solidarity.	  Lukes	  and	  Scull	  (1983)	  quote	  Durkheim,	  “There	  are	  
a	  whole	  host	  of	  acts	  which	  have	  been,	  and	  still	  are,	  regarded	  as	  criminal,	  without	  in	  
themselves	  being	  harmful	  to	  society”	  (pg.	  40).	  They	  go	  on	  to	  cite	  various	  religious-­‐
based	  laws	  such	  as	  eating	  certain	  kinds	  of	  meat,	  touching	  an	  object	  that	  is	  taboo,	  etc.,	  
suggesting	  that	  these	  laws	  are	  often	  enforced	  through	  penal	  sanctions,	  though	  they	  
have	  no	  real	  detriment	  to	  society.	  Rather,	  these	  laws	  reflect	  irrational	  values	  of	  the	  
collective	  consciousness,	  which	  remain	  unchanged	  in	  a	  society	  of	  mechanical	  
solidarity.	  Further,	  under	  mechanical	  solidarity,	  these	  laws	  are	  very	  difficult,	  if	  not	  
impossible	  to	  change	  due	  to	  the	  stringency	  of	  the	  collective	  consciousness.	  	  	  	  
	   Furthermore,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  repressive	  law	  tends	  to	  underestimate	  or	  
overestimate	  the	  harm	  of	  a	  given	  crime	  due	  to	  its	  strict	  reliance	  on	  the	  subjective	  
collective	  consciousness.	  Lukes	  and	  Scull	  (1983)	  argue	  further	  through	  a	  quote	  of	  
Durkheim,	  
“In	  the	  penal	  law	  of	  most	  civilized	  peoples,	  murder	  is	  universally	  regarded	  as	  
the	  greatest	  of	  crimes.	  Yet	  an	  economic	  crisis,	  a	  crash	  on	  the	  stock	  market,	  
even	  a	  bankruptcy,	  can	  disorganize	  a	  community	  much	  more	  seriously	  than	  
the	  isolated	  case	  of	  homicide”	  (pg.	  41).	  	  
	  
Indeed,	  mechanical	  solidarity,	  which	  is	  the	  result	  of	  an	  under-­‐developed	  division	  of	  
labour,	  and	  produces	  penal	  law,	  has	  particular	  weaknesses.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  marijuana	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use	  in	  the	  contemporary	  context,	  for	  example,	  which	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  cause	  social	  
harm,	  nor	  harm	  to	  the	  user,	  remains	  illegal.	  This	  is	  likely	  due	  to	  deeply	  rooted	  
religious	  values	  that	  oppose	  its	  use,	  if	  not	  traditional	  conservative	  political	  values	  
that	  do	  the	  same.	  Changing	  the	  legality	  of	  marijuana	  use	  would	  act	  as	  a	  shock	  to	  the	  
political	  and	  religious	  values	  that	  dominate	  society,	  and	  tend	  to	  shape	  the	  collective	  
consciousness.	  Though	  modern	  society	  has	  a	  complex	  division	  of	  labour,	  and	  
therefore	  is	  not	  necessarily	  defined	  by	  mechanical	  solidarity,	  this	  particular	  case	  
may	  be	  used	  as	  an	  example	  of	  a	  contradiction	  to	  the	  collective	  consciousness	  of	  
society	  resulting	  in	  penal	  sanctions,	  likely	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  retain	  social	  solidarity.	  	  
	  
Restitutive	  Law	  and	  Organic	  Solidarity	  
	   The	  opposing	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum	  in	  Durkheim’s	  binary	  understanding	  of	  
law	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  social	  solidarity	  is	  his	  discussion	  of	  restitutive,	  or	  
restorative	  law	  as	  it	  correlates	  with	  organic	  solidarity.	  The	  latter	  describes	  a	  type	  of	  
social	  solidarity	  that	  arises	  from	  a	  complex	  division	  of	  labour,	  unlike	  the	  
aforementioned	  relationship	  between	  repressive	  law	  and	  mechanical	  solidarity.	  
Organic	  solidarity,	  however,	  does	  not	  necessarily	  suggest	  a	  rigidly	  defined	  collective	  
consciousness,	  since	  members	  of	  society	  are	  relatively	  unique	  due	  to	  the	  complex	  
division	  of	  labour.	  Said	  complex	  division	  of	  labour	  is	  caused	  by	  the	  industrialization	  
and	  modernization	  of	  society.	  With	  an	  increased	  economic	  output	  –	  a	  result	  of	  
society’s	  eventual	  shift	  to	  a	  capitalist	  structure	  –	  worker	  specialization,	  and	  the	  
simplification	  of	  each	  worker’s	  tasks	  are	  indeed	  ways	  to	  maximize	  output	  and	  profit	  
in	  an	  industrial	  economy.	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  high	  degree	  of	  specialization,	  not	  only	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do	  their	  tasks	  in	  the	  workforce	  differ	  from	  one	  another,	  additionally,	  the	  values	  and	  
morality	  (which	  define	  the	  collective	  consciousness)	  are	  also	  unique,	  compared	  to	  
their	  societal	  counterpart.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  collective	  consciousness	  of	  the	  society	  
defined	  by	  organic	  solidarity	  is	  less	  rigid.	  Furthermore,	  contradictions	  to	  this	  
relatively	  less	  prevalent	  and	  less	  strictly	  defined	  collective	  consciousness	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  
criminal	  activity	  does	  not	  result	  in	  penal	  sanctions,	  rather,	  retributive	  sanctions	  
which	  seek	  to	  restore	  the	  social	  order	  as	  it	  existed	  prior	  to	  the	  commission	  of	  the	  
crime	  are	  preferred.	  As	  Durkheim	  puts	  it,	  	  
“The	  distinguishing	  mark	  of	  this	  sanction	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  expiatory,	  but	  comes	  
down	  to	  a	  mere	  restoration	  of	  the’	  status	  quo	  ante’…	  Damages	  awarded	  have	  
no	  penal	  character:	  they	  are	  simply	  a	  means	  of	  putting	  back	  the	  clock	  so	  as	  to	  
restore	  the	  past,	  so	  far	  as	  possible,	  to	  its	  normal	  state”	  (qtd	  in:	  Calhoun	  et.	  al.,	  
2012:	  p.	  229).	  
	  
In	  this	  way,	  organic	  solidarity	  –	  arising	  from	  a	  complex	  division	  of	  labour,	  and	  
resulting	  in	  a	  less	  stringent	  collective	  consciousness	  –	  is	  correlated	  to	  restitutive	  
law,	  according	  to	  the	  functionalist	  approach	  (Durkheim,	  1893).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   Interestingly,	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  organic	  solidarity	  –	  and	  subsequently	  
restitutive	  law	  –	  arises	  from	  a	  complex	  division	  of	  labour	  and	  thus	  increased	  inter-­‐
personal	  specialization,	  it	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  collective	  
consciousness,	  as	  was	  the	  previously	  discussed	  mechanical	  solidarity,	  as	  it	  related	  to	  
repressive	  law.	  Mechanical	  solidarity,	  as	  has	  been	  discussed,	  is	  the	  result	  of	  
widespread	  similarities	  between	  individuals,	  suggesting	  a	  strong,	  prevalent	  
collective	  consciousness.	  Organic	  solidarity	  however,	  suggests	  uniqueness,	  thus,	  the	  
collective	  consciousness	  is	  less	  prevalent.	  Law	  therefore	  does	  not	  seek	  to	  punish	  
acts	  that	  directly	  oppose	  the	  collective	  consciousness.	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“…	  Rules	  where	  sanctions	  are	  restitutory	  either	  constitute	  no	  part	  at	  all	  of	  the	  
collective	  consciousness,	  or	  subsist	  in	  it	  only	  in	  a	  weak	  state.	  Repressive	  law	  
corresponds	  to	  what	  is	  the	  heart	  and	  center	  of	  the	  common	  consciousness…	  
Restitutory	  law	  springs	  from	  the	  farthest	  zones	  of	  consciousness	  and	  extends	  
well	  beyond	  them.	  The	  more	  it	  truly	  becomes	  itself,	  the	  more	  it	  takes	  its	  
distance”	  (qtd	  in:	  Calhoun	  et.	  al.,	  2012:	  pg.	  230).	  	  	  	  
	  
Social	  solidarity	  is	  indeed	  produced	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  complex	  division	  of	  labour,	  
though	  in	  a	  quite	  different	  manner	  to	  that	  produced	  in	  the	  contrasting	  model.	  
Though	  in	  the	  society	  of	  organic	  solidarity	  individuals	  are	  interdependent,	  the	  lack	  
of	  a	  rigidly	  defined	  collective	  consciousness	  (through	  the	  lack	  of	  inter-­‐personal	  
uniqueness)	  allows	  for	  the	  individual	  to	  be	  disconnected	  from	  society	  –	  what	  
Durkheim	  calls	  anomie	  –	  despite	  the	  interdependence	  arising	  from	  the	  complex	  
division	  of	  labour.	  
	   To	  summarize	  this	  discussion,	  an	  analogy	  which	  was	  alluded	  to	  at	  the	  
beginning	  of	  this	  section	  will	  once	  again	  be	  drawn	  upon.	  Durkheim	  uses	  the	  terms	  
‘mechanical’	  and	  ‘organic’	  with	  a	  very	  specific	  intention.	  These	  terms	  are	  used	  to	  
contrast	  the	  two	  opposing	  types	  of	  solidarity	  by	  comparing	  the	  former	  to	  a	  machine,	  
and	  the	  latter	  to	  a	  living	  organism.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  ‘mechanical’	  solidarity	  –	  defined	  by	  
a	  strong	  collective	  consciousness,	  relative	  inter-­‐personal	  uniformity,	  and	  
resultantly,	  repressive	  law,	  
“The	  word	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  solidarity	  is	  produced	  by	  mechanical	  and	  
artificial	  means.	  We	  only	  use	  this	  term	  for	  it	  by	  analogy	  with	  the	  cohesion	  
that	  links	  together	  the	  elements	  of	  raw	  materials…”	  (qtd	  in:	  Calhoun	  et.	  al.,	  
2012:	  pg.	  232).	  	  
	  
Like	  in	  a	  machine,	  the	  members	  of	  society	  (or,	  the	  raw	  materials	  which	  make	  up	  the	  
machine)	  in	  this	  case,	  are	  held	  together	  by	  a	  strong	  collective	  consciousness	  (the	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cohesion	  the	  links	  the	  various	  parts	  together).	  Conversely,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  organic	  
solidarity	  –	  defined	  by	  a	  weakened	  collective	  consciousness,	  a	  complex	  division	  of	  
labour,	  and	  resultantly,	  restitutive	  law,	  
“This	  solidarity	  resembles	  that	  observed	  in	  higher	  animals.	  In	  fact,	  each	  
organ	  has	  its	  own	  special	  characteristics	  and	  autonomy,	  yet	  the	  greater	  the	  
unity	  of	  the	  organism,	  the	  more	  marked	  the	  individualization	  of	  the	  parts”	  
(qtd	  in:	  Calhoun	  et.	  al.,	  2012:	  pg.	  233).	  	  
	  
Like	  in	  a	  biological	  organism,	  each	  worker	  (or,	  organ	  in	  the	  organism)	  in	  a	  society	  
defined	  by	  organic	  solidarity	  has	  his	  or	  her	  own	  specialized	  job,	  which	  contributes	  
to	  the	  betterment	  of	  society	  as	  a	  whole	  (or,	  sustaining	  the	  life	  of	  the	  organism).	  
Furthermore,	  each	  individual	  has	  their	  own	  unique	  system	  of	  values	  and	  beliefs,	  not	  
necessarily	  fully	  corresponding	  to	  the	  collective	  consciousness.	  Law	  therefore	  




Crime	  and	  Deviance:	  A	  Functionalist	  Understanding	   	  
As	  the	  name	  of	  the	  approach	  suggests	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  ‘functionalist’	  approach	  –	  
all	  social	  phenomena	  serve	  a	  particular	  function	  in	  society.	  Of	  course,	  it	  may	  be	  
generally	  accepted	  that	  law	  seeks	  to	  protect	  the	  interests	  of	  society,	  whether	  that	  
society	  is	  defined	  by	  mechanical	  or	  organic	  solidarity,	  as	  discussed	  previously,	  and	  
is	  thus	  viewed	  as	  being	  generally	  beneficial	  to	  society.	  That	  is	  also	  to	  say	  that	  those	  
social	  phenomena	  traditionally	  considered	  to	  be	  detrimental	  to	  society	  must	  also	  be	  
seen	  as	  functional,	  i.e.	  useful	  and	  necessary.	  The	  antithesis	  of	  law,	  that	  is	  crime,	  
ought	  to	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  social	  phenomenon	  that	  is	  logically	  considered	  to	  be	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problematic	  in	  society.	  Perhaps	  it	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  certain	  failure	  of	  society,	  or	  
should	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  an	  act	  of	  an	  individual	  that	  is	  a	  social	  anomaly,	  but	  
regardless,	  crime	  –	  being	  a	  form	  of	  social	  deviance	  –	  is	  often	  viewed	  as	  a	  social	  
problem.	  Durkheim,	  being	  a	  functionalist,	  would	  suggest	  quite	  the	  contrary.	  Crime,	  
like	  law,	  is	  not	  only	  considered	  to	  be	  an	  unavoidable,	  and	  highly	  normalized	  aspect	  
of	  society,	  but	  indeed	  serves	  a	  particular	  function	  for	  the	  betterment	  of	  society	  as	  a	  
whole.	  Durkheim	  recognizes	  the	  common	  view	  of	  criminality	  as	  a	  social	  problem,	  
and	  seeks	  to	  contest	  said	  notion	  in	  “The	  Normality	  of	  Crime”	  from	  The	  Rules	  of	  The	  
Sociological	  Method	  (1895),	  	  
“If	  there	  is	  a	  fact	  whose	  pathological	  nature	  appears	  indisputable,	  it	  is	  crime.	  
All	  criminologists	  agree	  on	  this	  score…	  However,	  the	  problem	  needs	  to	  be	  
treated	  less	  summarily”	  (Lukes	  &	  Scull,	  1983.	  Pg.	  70).	  	  
	  
Durkheim	  therefore	  seeks	  to	  discuss	  the	  nature	  of	  crime,	  and	  the	  criminal,	  in	  terms	  
of	  their	  functions	  in	  society.	  Durkheim’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  usefulness	  of	  crime	  is	  
two-­‐fold.	  Firstly,	  Durkheim	  suggests	  that	  a	  society’s	  definition	  of	  crime	  necessarily	  
restricts	  that	  society’s	  members	  from	  committing	  far	  more	  severe	  actions.	  Further,	  
criminal	  definitions	  preclude	  a	  society	  from	  punishing	  a	  less	  severe	  action	  with	  
unnecessarily	  harsh	  consequences.	  Since	  deviance	  and	  crime	  are	  social	  facts	  that	  
necessarily	  exist	  in	  all	  societies,	  crime	  cannot	  ever	  truly	  disappear,	  but	  rather,	  can	  
only	  change	  forms.	  The	  abolishment	  of	  one	  crime	  only	  brings	  about	  another,	  likely	  
of	  greater	  severity	  in	  terms	  of	  social	  harm.	  	  
“For	  murderers	  to	  disappear,	  the	  horror	  of	  bloodshed	  must	  increase	  in	  those	  
strata	  of	  society	  from	  which	  murderers	  are	  recruited;	  but	  for	  this	  to	  happen	  
the	  abhorrence	  must	  increase	  throughout	  society.	  Moreover,	  the	  very	  
absence	  of	  crime	  would	  contribute	  directly	  to	  bringing	  about	  that	  result,	  for	  a	  
sentiment	  appears	  much	  more	  respectable	  when	  it	  is	  always	  and	  uniformly	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respected”	  (Lukes	  &	  Scull,	  1983.	  Pg.	  72).	  	  
The	  removal	  of	  murderers	  would	  not	  be	  beneficial	  to	  society	  because	  it	  could	  only	  
be	  possible	  by	  increasing	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  collective	  consciousness,	  and	  thus	  
increasing	  society’s	  ill-­‐feeling	  toward	  crime,	  broadly	  conceived.	  In	  doing	  so,	  society	  
becomes	  more	  sensitive	  to	  crime,	  and	  due	  to	  the	  removal	  of	  murderers	  (previously	  
considered	  to	  be	  the	  worst	  kind	  of	  criminals,	  deserving	  severe	  punishment),	  society	  
will	  punish	  less	  severe	  crimes	  with	  unnecessarily	  harsh	  sanctions.	  Murder,	  as	  an	  
example	  of	  extreme	  crime,	  is	  therefore	  functional	  in	  society	  as	  it	  regulates	  the	  
sanctions	  that	  society	  associates	  with	  other	  forms	  of	  less	  severe	  crime.	  	  
	   A	  second	  function	  of	  crime	  is	  that	  it	  systematically	  controls	  the	  strength	  of	  
the	  collective	  consciousness.	  In	  a	  hypothetical	  extreme	  case	  of	  mechanical	  solidarity	  
(as	  previously	  discussed),	  wherein	  the	  collective	  consciousness	  dominates	  all	  
members	  of	  society,	  demanding	  uniformity,	  originality	  is	  impossible.	  In	  this	  
hypothetical	  society,	  the	  rigid,	  and	  strict	  collective	  consciousness	  is	  not	  capable	  of	  
developing	  in	  a	  progressive	  manner	  due	  to	  its	  very	  nature.	  Consequently,	  society	  
itself	  is	  not	  capable	  of	  bettering	  itself.	  The	  same	  is	  true	  of	  criminality	  –	  another	  form	  
of	  challenging	  the	  norms	  of	  the	  collective	  consciousness.	  	  
“For	  [the	  collective	  consciousness]	  to	  evolve,	  the	  individual	  originality	  must	  
be	  allowed	  to	  manifest	  itself.	  But	  so	  that	  the	  originality	  of	  the	  idealist	  who	  
dreams	  of	  transcending	  his	  era	  may	  display	  itself,	  that	  of	  the	  criminal,	  which	  
falls	  short	  of	  the	  age,	  must	  also	  be	  possible.	  One	  does	  not	  go	  without	  the	  
other”	  (Lukes	  &	  Scull,	  1983.	  Pg.	  74).	  	  	  
Indeed,	  in	  order	  for	  society	  to	  move	  forward	  in	  a	  positive	  manner,	  by	  challenging	  
the	  collective	  consciousness	  (which	  must	  be	  somewhat	  weak	  in	  order	  for	  this	  to	  be	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possible),	  crime	  must	  exist,	  as	  it	  also	  seeks	  to	  challenge	  the	  collective	  consciousness	  
in	  a	  similar	  fashion.	  Durkheim	  draws	  upon	  the	  example	  of	  Socrates,	  in	  order	  to	  
further	  establish	  his	  point.	  
“According	  to	  Athenian	  law,	  Socrates	  was	  a	  criminal	  and	  his	  condemnation	  
was	  entirely	  just.	  	  However,	  his	  crime	  –	  his	  independence	  of	  thought	  –	  was	  
useful	  not	  only	  for	  humanity	  but	  for	  his	  country”	  (Lukes	  &	  Scull,	  1983.	  Pg.	  
74).	  
In	  the	  specific	  case	  of	  Socrates	  and	  his	  revolutionary	  thought	  –	  once	  considered	  a	  
crime	  –	  his	  criminality	  was	  in	  fact	  a	  contributor	  to	  the	  betterment	  of	  society.	  
Therefore,	  not	  only	  is	  crime	  necessary	  if	  society	  wishes	  to	  progress,	  but	  in	  fact,	  
crime	  itself	  is	  capable	  of	  contributing	  to	  the	  beneficial	  progression	  of	  the	  society	  in	  
which	  it	  exists.	  From	  the	  functionalist	  perspective,	  crime	  is	  therefore	  beneficial	  in	  
two	  distinct	  ways;	  it	  firstly	  regulates	  punishment	  in	  terms	  of	  severity	  (as	  discussed	  
through	  the	  example	  of	  the	  removal	  of	  society’s	  murderers),	  and	  secondly,	  it	  
facilitates,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  actively	  contributes	  to	  the	  betterment	  and	  progression	  
of	  society.	  	  
	   While	  a	  powerful,	  stringent	  and	  prevalent	  collective	  consciousness	  –	  as	  it	  
exists	  in	  a	  society	  defined	  by	  mechanical	  solidarity	  –	  may	  indeed	  be	  a	  detriment	  to	  
society	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  restricts	  social	  change	  and	  progress	  (as	  well	  as	  crime),	  
so	  too	  can	  the	  other	  extreme,	  that	  is,	  a	  weak,	  seemingly	  non-­‐existent	  collective	  
consciousness.	  In	  a	  society	  defined	  by	  extreme	  organic	  solidarity,	  wherein	  solidarity	  
arises	  from	  the	  division	  of	  labour,	  not	  through	  similarity,	  thus	  having	  a	  weak	  
collective	  consciousness,	  what	  Durkheim	  called	  ‘anomie’	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  occur.	  
When	  an	  individual	  becomes	  completely	  disconnected	  from	  the	  society	  in	  which	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they	  live	  they	  experience	  anomie.	  Suicide	  (1897)	  discusses	  the	  concept	  of	  anomie	  as	  
it	  relates	  to	  the	  commission	  of	  suicide.	  Specifically,	  the	  latter	  two	  forms	  of	  suicide	  
that	  Durkheim	  discusses	  –	  egoistic	  and	  anomic	  –	  are	  a	  result	  of	  an	  individual	  being	  
disconnected	  from	  society.	  	  
“In	  egoistic	  suicide,	  it	  is	  deficient	  in	  truly	  collective	  activity,	  thus	  depriving	  
[the	  individual]	  of	  object	  and	  meaning.	  In	  anomic	  Suicide,	  society’s	  influence	  
in	  the	  basically	  individual	  passions,	  thus	  leaving	  them	  without	  a	  check-­‐rein”	  
(qtd	  in:	  Calhoun	  et.	  al.,	  2012:	  pg.	  264).	  	  
Suicide	  ought	  to	  be	  considered	  a	  form	  of	  deviance,	  and	  perhaps	  criminality.	  
Historically,	  both	  religious	  doctrines	  as	  well	  as	  legal	  ones	  have	  prohibited	  suicide,	  as	  
it	  is	  unanimously	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  breach	  of	  the	  collective	  consciousness	  (Lukes	  &	  
Scull,	  1983).	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  suicide	  ought	  to	  be	  considered	  “…	  an	  act	  indifferent	  to	  
morality”	  (Lukes	  &	  Scull,	  1983.	  Pg.	  135).	  Durkheim’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  
suicide	  helps	  to	  illustrate	  the	  link	  he	  perceives	  between	  a	  lack	  of	  social	  connectivity	  
within	  the	  individual	  and	  that	  individual’s	  likelihood	  of	  deviating	  from	  the	  norms	  of	  
the	  collective	  consciousness.	  Therefore,	  Durkheim	  argues	  that	  in	  an	  extreme	  case	  of	  
mechanical	  solidarity	  (having	  an	  overly	  powerful	  collective	  consciousness)	  as	  well	  
as	  in	  a	  case	  of	  extreme	  organic	  solidarity	  (having	  a	  drastically	  weakened	  collective	  
consciousness),	  society	  is	  harmed.	  Additionally,	  both	  of	  these	  extremes	  are	  






Conclusion	  to	  the	  Functionalist	  Approach	  
To	  summarize	  this	  chapter,	  which	  discussed	  the	  functionalist	  approach	  to	  the	  
sociology	  of	  law,	  it	  began	  with	  an	  outline	  of	  Durkheim’s	  binary	  understandings	  of	  
law	  and	  social	  solidarity	  (repressive/restitutive,	  mechanical/organic).	  Here,	  
Durkheim	  suggested	  that	  each	  type	  of	  law	  corresponds	  with	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  
social	  solidarity.	  Law	  is	  therefore	  a	  means	  of	  measuring	  social	  solidarity,	  which	  is	  a	  
concept	  that	  cannot	  be	  observed	  or	  measured	  as	  such.	  Specifically,	  mechanical	  
solidarity	  (that	  is	  solidarity	  based	  on	  similarity,	  and	  arising	  from	  a	  under-­‐developed	  
division	  of	  labour)	  corresponds	  with	  repressive	  legal	  sanctions.	  Since	  the	  collective	  
consciousness	  in	  this	  case	  is	  very	  strong,	  repressive	  sanctions	  are	  necessary	  to	  
punish	  those	  who	  contradict	  it.	  Conversely,	  organic	  solidarity	  (that	  is	  solidarity	  
which	  arises	  from	  inter-­‐personal	  dependence,	  and	  a	  highly	  specialized	  division	  of	  
labour)	  correlates	  with	  restitutive	  legal	  sanctions.	  The	  collective	  consciousness	  in	  
this	  case	  is	  quite	  weak,	  and	  therefore	  penal	  sanctions	  are	  not	  necessary.	  Since	  these	  
relationships	  (repressive	  law	  and	  mechanical	  solidarity/	  restitutive	  law	  and	  organic	  
solidarity)	  are	  also	  related	  to	  the	  collective	  consciousness,	  law	  ought	  to	  be	  
considered	  an	  external	  manifestation	  of	  the	  strength	  of	  a	  given	  society’s	  collective	  
consciousness.	  	  
	   After	  discussing	  law,	  this	  chapter	  sought	  to	  additionally	  discuss	  the	  concept	  
of	  crime,	  as	  a	  functional	  social	  phenomenon.	  As	  was	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail,	  crime	  
is	  seen,	  from	  this	  perspective	  to	  be	  beneficial	  to	  society	  in	  a	  two-­‐fold	  manner.	  It	  
firstly	  acts	  as	  a	  regulator	  of	  the	  harshness	  of	  legal	  sanctions,	  and	  secondly	  it	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facilitates	  the	  growth	  and	  development	  of	  society’s	  collective	  consciousness.	  This	  
section	  went	  on	  to	  suggest	  that	  crime	  and	  deviance	  are	  largely	  the	  result	  of	  anomie.	  
This	  was	  done	  through	  the	  use	  of	  Suicide	  (1897).	  Overall,	  the	  functionalist	  sociology	  
of	  law	  ought	  to	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  general	  understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  























A	  Critical	  Comparison	  and	  Synthesis	  of	  the	  Sociology	  of	  Law	  
	  
The	  sociology	  of	  law	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  classical	  theory	  should	  not	  be	  
simply	  considered	  to	  be	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  social	  construction	  and	  definition	  of	  law,	  
but	  rather	  a	  multidimensional	  sociological	  examination	  of	  law	  in	  society.	  By	  
examining	  the	  various	  works	  of	  the	  three	  founding	  fathers	  of	  sociology	  –	  Karl	  Marx,	  
Max	  Weber,	  and	  Emile	  Durkheim	  –	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  their	  respective	  
sociologies	  of	  law,	  this	  paper	  has	  discussed	  the	  field	  from	  three	  separate	  
epistemological	  frameworks	  (conflict-­‐determinist,	  conflict-­‐dialectical,	  and	  
functionalist)	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  create	  a	  well-­‐rounded	  understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  
between	  law	  and	  society.	  While	  the	  three	  theorists	  have	  approached	  and	  
understood	  the	  subject	  in	  different	  ways,	  what	  remains	  constant	  and	  is	  indeed	  
crucial	  to	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  sociology	  of	  law	  as	  a	  whole,	  is	  said	  relationship	  between	  
law	  and	  society.	  This	  concluding	  section	  will	  seek	  to	  first	  summarize	  the	  three	  
approaches	  to	  the	  sociology	  of	  law.	  Secondly,	  differences	  will	  be	  pointed	  out	  
between	  the	  three	  to	  further	  emphasize	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  indeed	  quite	  distinct.	  
As	  already	  argued,	  understanding	  all	  three	  is	  crucial	  to	  a	  comprehensive	  
understanding	  of	  the	  field.	  Therefore,	  the	  final	  aspect	  of	  this	  section	  will	  seek	  to	  
draw	  all	  three	  together,	  creating	  a	  singular,	  holistic	  understanding	  of	  the	  sociology	  
of	  law,	  largely	  through	  a	  commonality	  that	  remains	  constant	  in	  all	  three	  approaches;	  
that	  is,	  the	  positivist	  approach	  that	  all	  three	  sociologies	  of	  law	  tend	  to	  utilize.	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Summary	  of	  the	  Three	  Contrasting	  Approaches	  	  
In	  summation	  of	  this	  thesis,	  we	  discussed	  the	  sociology	  of	  law	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  
fundamental	  relationship	  between	  society	  and	  law	  –	  from	  the	  conflict-­‐determinist	  
(Marxist),	  conflict-­‐dialectical	  (Weberian),	  and	  Functionalist	  (Durkheimian)	  
approaches.	  	  
	   The	  conflict	  approach	  to	  the	  sociology	  of	  law	  introduced	  the	  concept	  of	  class	  
conflict,	  as	  it	  pertains	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  law.	  Specifically,	  from	  this	  approach,	  
law	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  hegemonic	  discourse	  that	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  economic	  elite	  (the	  
bourgeoisie)	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  seeks	  to	  maintain	  the	  existing	  social	  and	  economic	  
hierarchy,	  thus	  perpetuating	  the	  exploitation	  of	  the	  economic	  underclass	  (the	  
proletariat).	  Therefore,	  the	  relationship	  between	  law	  and	  the	  economy	  was	  
introduced	  here.	  This	  approach	  was	  divided	  into	  three	  distinct	  variants,	  
representing	  various	  schools	  of	  Marxism,	  all	  focused	  on	  class	  conflict.	  According	  to	  
the	  first	  perspective	  –	  the	  deterministic	  perspective	  –	  law	  is	  seen	  solely	  as	  a	  
reflection	  of	  elite	  economic	  interests,	  and	  is	  therefore	  a	  tool	  for	  perpetuating	  
bourgeois	  dominance.	  The	  second	  perspective	  –	  the	  semi-­‐autonomy	  perspective	  –	  
expanded	  upon	  the	  deterministic	  perspective	  by	  suggesting	  that	  not	  only	  is	  law	  a	  
tool	  of	  perpetuating	  economic	  dominance,	  but	  in	  fact,	  cultural	  dominance	  as	  well.	  
Therefore,	  law	  is	  seen	  from	  this	  perspective	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  oppression	  along	  lines	  of	  
race,	  gender,	  and	  political	  values.	  While	  maintaining	  the	  notion	  that	  economic	  class	  
conflict	  remains	  central	  to	  the	  discussion,	  this	  perspective	  suggests	  that	  said	  
economic	  dominance	  suggests	  cultural	  dominance,	  further	  accentuating	  the	  
immense	  social	  power	  of	  the	  bourgeoisie.	  Lastly,	  the	  dialectical	  variant	  comes	  close	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to	  Weber’s	  conflict-­‐	  dialectical	  approach	  to	  law.	  As	  the	  similar	  title	  to	  the	  latter	  
perspective	  of	  the	  conflict	  approach	  suggests,	  the	  relationship	  between	  law	  and	  
economy	  is	  seen	  here	  as	  reciprocal	  in	  nature.	  While	  economic	  factors	  indeed	  hold	  
the	  capacity	  to	  determine	  (or	  at	  least	  effect)	  legal	  definitions	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  
previous	  two	  perspectives,	  the	  same	  may	  be	  true	  in	  reverse.	  Changes	  in	  legal	  
definitions,	  from	  this	  perspective,	  in	  some	  cases	  affect	  or	  precipitate	  changes	  in	  the	  
economic	  structure.	  	  
	   Unknowingly	  following	  this	  variant	  of	  Marx’s	  interpretation	  of	  the	  historical	  
materialist	  theory,	  Weber	  maintains	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  law	  
and	  economy,	  and	  similarly	  to	  the	  dialectical	  perspective	  discussed	  above,	  the	  
relationship	  between	  the	  two	  is	  seen	  by	  Weber	  as	  reciprocal.	  Similarly	  to	  Marx,	  
much	  of	  Weber’s	  work	  is	  situated	  within	  a	  particular	  historical	  context	  and	  his	  
theories	  of	  law	  derive	  from	  well-­‐grounded	  historical	  research	  and	  analysis.	  Weber’s	  
approach	  was	  divided	  in	  this	  paper	  into	  two	  sections,	  both	  of	  which	  sought	  to	  
discuss	  the	  rise	  of	  capitalist	  institutions	  (and	  the	  economic	  structure	  of	  capitalism	  
itself),	  which	  was	  viewed	  as	  an	  economic	  change,	  fundamentally	  tied	  to	  the	  law	  in	  a	  
reciprocal	  manner.	  Firstly,	  through	  empirical	  economic	  and	  historical	  research	  the	  
dialectical	  relationship	  between	  law	  and	  economy	  was	  discussed	  through	  the	  use	  of	  
the	  rise	  of	  capitalism	  out	  of	  ancient	  Rome.	  Here,	  in	  Weber’s	  early	  works,	  the	  rise	  of	  
various	  capitalist	  institutions,	  the	  eventual	  shift	  to	  a	  capitalist	  structure,	  and	  the	  fall	  
of	  the	  ancient	  economic	  structure	  were	  seen	  as	  determinants	  of	  legal	  changes,	  while	  
simultaneously	  being	  determined	  by	  said	  legal	  changes.	  This	  paper’s	  second	  section	  
under	  this	  approach	  discussed	  the	  ideological	  implications	  and	  foundations	  of	  law.	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While	  maintaining	  that	  empirical	  economic	  factors	  are	  central	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  
capitalism,	  this	  section	  suggested	  that	  ideology	  (namely	  religious	  ideology)	  ought	  to	  
be	  viewed	  as	  a	  supplementary	  factor	  in	  this	  type	  of	  economic	  transition.	  Using	  the	  
example	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  modern	  capitalism	  in	  the	  West,	  the	  Calvinist	  ‘Protestant	  Ethic’,	  
which	  was	  adopted	  by	  the	  Puritans,	  was	  seen	  to	  be	  a	  contributing	  factor	  to	  the	  rise	  
of	  Western	  capitalism.	  Law,	  as	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  Protestant	  ethic	  and	  a	  
form	  of	  ideology,	  is	  reciprocally	  related	  to	  the	  economy.	  	  	   	  
The	  functionalist	  approach	  is	  significantly	  different	  from	  the	  previous	  two.	  
Durkheim’s	  understanding	  of	  law	  discusses	  law	  and	  crime	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  
functions	  as	  social	  phenomena.	  In	  doing	  so,	  Durkheim	  sought	  to	  classify	  different	  
types	  of	  law,	  and	  correlate	  them	  with	  one	  of	  his	  central	  theoretical	  concepts,	  social	  
solidarity.	  With	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  sanctions	  that	  law	  imposes,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  
specifics	  of	  the	  laws	  themselves,	  Durkheim	  suggests	  that	  law	  may	  be	  classified	  as	  
either	  repressive	  or	  restitutive	  (retributive	  and	  restorative	  respectively,	  in	  
contemporary	  criminological	  terms).	  These	  two	  ideal	  types	  correspond	  to	  his	  two	  
types	  of	  social	  solidarity,	  and	  are	  the	  external	  manifestations	  of,	  and	  measures	  for,	  
social	  solidarity.	  Repressive	  law	  tends	  to	  exist	  in	  a	  society	  defined	  by	  mechanical	  
solidarity	  (an	  undeveloped	  division	  of	  labour,	  and	  stringent	  collective	  
consciousness)	  since	  penal	  sanctions	  may	  be	  used	  as	  a	  means	  of	  punishing	  the	  
perpetrator,	  and	  thus	  retaining	  the	  social	  solidarity,	  which	  in	  this	  case	  arises	  from	  
inter-­‐personal	  similarities.	  Restitutive	  law	  tends	  to	  exist	  in	  a	  society	  defined	  by	  
organic	  solidarity	  (a	  complex	  division	  of	  labour,	  and	  weak	  collective	  consciousness)	  
as	  restitutive	  sanctions	  seek	  to	  restore	  the	  previously	  existing	  social	  conditions	  that	  
	  
64	  
existed	  prior	  to	  the	  commission	  of	  the	  crime.	  In	  doing	  so,	  social	  solidarity,	  in	  this	  
case	  arising	  from	  inter-­‐personal	  uniqueness,	  is	  effectively	  strengthened.	  From	  the	  
functionalist	  perspective	  then,	  law	  is	  seen	  as	  an	  external	  manifestation	  of	  the	  
relative	  strength	  of	  the	  collective	  consciousness	  of	  a	  given	  society,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  
indicator	  of	  the	  type	  of	  social	  solidarity	  that	  exists	  there.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  this	  discussion,	  the	  concept	  of	  anomie	  –	  that	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  social	  
connection	  –	  was	  discussed	  as	  it	  pertains	  to	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  deviance,	  suicide.	  
Here,	  the	  lack	  of	  social	  connection	  within	  the	  individual	  was	  discussed	  as	  a	  
contributing	  factor	  to	  deviance,	  i.e.	  suicide	  and	  criminal	  activity.	  While	  the	  previous	  
two	  approaches	  seek	  to	  discuss	  the	  particular	  relationship	  between	  law	  and	  the	  
economy,	  the	  functionalist	  approach	  discusses	  the	  relationship	  between	  law	  and	  
society	  more	  broadly.	  As	  will	  be	  seen,	  these	  ostensibly	  different	  foci	  are	  in	  fact	  
fundamentally	  quite	  similar.	  
	   Of	  course,	  each	  of	  the	  three	  sociologies	  of	  law	  has	  its	  advantages	  and	  
drawbacks.	  	  The	  critique	  of	  the	  Marxist	  approach	  that	  was	  presented	  here	  is	  that	  
Marx’s	  sociology	  of	  law	  focuses	  solely	  on	  social	  conflict	  (regardless	  of	  the	  particular	  
understanding	  of	  Marxism	  within	  the	  conflict	  approach).	  In	  assuming	  that	  law	  is	  a	  
reflection	  of	  the	  economically	  dominant	  class	  of	  a	  given	  society,	  Marx’s	  sociology	  of	  
law	  fails	  to	  consider	  the	  multi-­‐dimensional	  aspects	  of	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  law.	  
Certainly,	  matters	  of	  economics	  should	  not	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  sole	  contributors	  
to	  the	  shape	  of	  law	  in	  society.	  Weber’s	  sociology	  of	  law,	  also	  being	  primarily	  focused	  
on	  conflict	  at	  its	  foundation	  (specifically	  economic	  conflict)	  is	  also	  subject	  to	  a	  
similar	  criticism	  as	  discussed	  pertaining	  to	  Marx.	  Though	  Weber	  discusses	  a	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dialectical	  relationship	  between	  law	  and	  economy,	  his	  sole	  focus	  on	  conflict	  (like	  
Marx)	  restricts	  his	  discussion	  similarly	  to	  his	  conflict-­‐oriented	  predecessor.	  The	  
criticism	  of	  Durkheim’s	  functionalist	  approach	  is	  that	  it	  employs	  a	  teleological	  
reasoning.	  Crime,	  for	  example,	  from	  the	  functionalist	  approach	  is	  argued	  to	  be	  
beneficial	  to	  society	  as	  a	  whole;	  that	  is,	  crime	  has	  a	  specific	  ‘function’	  in	  society,	  as	  
was	  described	  in	  chapter	  three.	  While	  crime	  (or	  law)	  is	  seen	  as	  having	  a	  function	  in	  
society,	  this	  function	  is	  not	  its	  cause,	  though	  the	  functionalist	  perspective	  blurs	  the	  
two.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Convergences	  and	  Divergences	  Between	  Marx,	  Weber,	  and	  Durkheim	  
	   This	  final	  section	  will	  seek	  to	  identify	  particular	  convergences	  and	  
divergences	  in	  the	  understandings	  of	  law	  of	  Marx,	  Weber,	  and	  Durkheim	  in	  order	  to	  
facilitate	  the	  concluding	  synthesis.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  this	  section	  will	  firstly	  discuss	  
the	  focus	  of	  each	  of	  the	  sociologies	  of	  law	  (while	  Marx	  and	  Weber	  focus	  on	  the	  
relationship	  law	  shares	  with	  the	  economy,	  Durkheim	  focuses	  on	  the	  relationship	  it	  
shares	  with	  society,	  more	  generally).	  Secondly,	  it	  will	  discuss	  how	  each	  sociological	  
thinker	  explains	  law	  (while	  Marx	  and	  Weber	  discuss	  law	  based	  on	  empirical	  
historical	  research	  and	  search	  for	  causes,	  Durkheim	  discusses	  law	  in	  terms	  of	  broad,	  
a-­‐historical	  ideal	  types	  and	  law’s	  function	  in	  society).	  Lastly,	  to	  bring	  all	  three	  
together,	  this	  section	  will	  discuss	  the	  positivist	  nature	  of	  all	  three	  sociologies	  of	  law.	  
Despite	  their	  differences,	  Marx,	  Weber,	  and	  Durkheim	  all	  use	  a	  positivist	  framework	  
in	  their	  respective	  conceptualizations	  of	  law.	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It	  has	  been	  well	  established	  that	  the	  conflict	  and	  dialectical	  approaches	  focus	  
their	  respective	  discussions	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  economy	  and	  law	  while	  the	  
functionalist	  approach	  discusses	  the	  relationship	  between	  law	  and	  society,	  more	  
generally.	  While	  this	  may	  be	  perceived	  as	  another	  distinction	  between	  the	  former	  
two	  and	  the	  latter,	  it	  is	  argued	  here	  that	  all	  three	  seek	  to	  discuss	  the	  fundamental	  
relationship	  between	  law	  and	  society	  at	  their	  foundations.	  For	  Marx	  and	  Weber	  ‘the	  
economy’	  is	  a	  rather	  broad	  term,	  referring	  to	  the	  means	  by	  which	  individuals	  
sustain	  themselves,	  and	  subsequently,	  ‘the	  economy’	  is	  the	  very	  fabric	  of	  society;	  the	  
economy	  is	  indeed	  what	  defines	  and	  perpetuates	  the	  existence	  of	  society.	  Therefore,	  
while	  Marx	  and	  Weber	  focus	  on	  the	  economy	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  law,	  at	  the	  foundation	  of	  
both	  sociologies	  of	  law	  is	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  law	  and	  society,	  
much	  like	  Durkheim’s	  generalized	  discussion	  in	  the	  functionalist	  approach.	  All	  three	  
approaches,	  though	  ostensibly	  different,	  indeed	  discuss	  the	  necessary	  relationship	  
between	  and	  law	  and	  society,	  and	  are	  therefore	  quite	  comparable,	  and	  are	  all	  
considered	  significant	  theoretical	  approaches	  in	  the	  greater	  field	  of	  the	  sociology	  of	  
law.	  
Another	  key	  difference	  that	  sets	  the	  conflict	  and	  dialectical	  approaches	  apart	  
from	  the	  functionalist	  approach	  is	  that	  the	  former	  two	  derive	  from	  historical	  
research	  and	  are	  historically	  (and	  empirically)	  grounded.	  Marx	  famously	  discusses	  
the	  various	  changes	  in	  economic	  structure	  through	  changes	  in	  the	  mode	  of	  
production,	  as	  they	  contribute	  to	  the	  eventual	  rise	  of	  the	  capitalist	  structure	  and	  
corresponding	  legal	  landscape.	  Similarly,	  Weber	  discusses,	  with	  a	  lot	  of	  historical	  
detail,	  the	  rise	  of	  capitalism	  out	  of	  both	  ancient	  Rome,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  more	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contemporary	  Western	  world.	  Therefore,	  both	  conflict-­‐oriented	  understandings	  of	  
law	  (Marx	  and	  Weber)	  discuss	  changes	  in	  the	  economic	  structure	  of	  society	  
historically,	  as	  being	  relevant	  to	  the	  larger	  discussion	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  
law	  and	  society.	  	  
	   Marx,	  Weber,	  and	  Durkheim,	  in	  their	  respective	  sociologies	  of	  law	  all	  use	  a	  
positivist	  framework	  in	  discussing	  the	  macro-­‐sociological	  relationship	  between	  
society	  and	  law.	  All	  three	  approaches	  focus	  on	  observable	  social	  phenomena	  as	  they	  
relate	  to	  law.	  Marx	  and	  Weber,	  of	  course	  primarily	  focus	  on	  the	  political	  economy	  in	  
its	  relationship	  to	  law.	  Whether	  law	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  economic	  
interests	  of	  the	  elite,	  or	  as	  having	  a	  reciprocal	  relationship	  with	  the	  economy,	  in	  
both	  cases,	  the	  sociology	  of	  law	  is	  discussed	  in	  an	  observable,	  positivist	  manner.	  
Interestingly,	  though	  Weber	  is	  considered	  the	  founder	  of	  the	  interpretive	  school	  of	  
sociology,	  his	  understanding	  of	  law	  is	  purely	  positivist,	  a	  contradiction	  to	  the	  
traditional	  Weberian	  sociological	  approach.	  Durkheim’s	  sociology	  of	  law	  is	  also	  
positivist	  in	  nature.	  While	  the	  approach	  does	  not	  focus	  on	  economic	  matters	  as	  
mentioned,	  Durkheim’s	  	  understanding	  of	  law	  as	  an	  external	  manifestation	  of	  the	  
collective	  consciousness	  and	  therefore	  an	  indicator	  of	  the	  type	  of	  social	  solidarity	  
that	  exists	  in	  society	  suggests	  a	  positivist	  approach	  to	  the	  otherwise	  abstract	  
theoretical	  concepts.	  	  
	   In	  sum,	  while	  the	  lack	  of	  historical	  grounding	  in	  Durkheim’s	  sociology	  of	  law	  
tends	  to	  suggest	  a	  certain	  separation	  between	  it	  and	  the	  theories	  of	  Marx	  and	  
Weber,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  basic	  methodological	  /	  epistemological	  disjuncture	  between	  the	  
logic	  of	  causality	  versus	  functional	  “explanations”,	  all	  three	  sociologies	  of	  law	  share	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a	  fundamental	  focus	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  law	  and	  society,	  examined	  in	  a	  
positivist	  way.	  	  	  
	   	  
	   In	  conclusion,	  the	  sociology	  of	  law	  is	  undoubtedly	  a	  multi-­‐dimensional	  
sociological	  field	  that	  ought	  to	  consider	  an	  array	  of	  topics	  including,	  but	  not	  limited	  
to:	  economics,	  race,	  gender,	  politics,	  and	  religion.	  The	  discussion	  would	  be	  
incomplete	  without	  a	  thorough	  understanding	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  all	  social	  
phenomena	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  definition	  or	  generation	  of	  law	  in	  society.	  	  Certainly,	  
a	  well-­‐rounded	  understanding	  of	  the	  sociology	  of	  law	  in	  terms	  of	  classical	  theory	  
must	  incorporate	  the	  works	  of	  all	  three	  founding	  fathers	  of	  sociology.	  Based	  on	  my	  
examination,	  comparison	  and	  assessment	  of	  the	  three	  classical	  sociological	  thinkers	  
respective	  sociologies	  of	  law,	  I	  argue	  in	  this	  thesis	  that	  a	  well-­‐rounded	  and	  critical	  
sociology	  of	  law	  must	  include	  the	  following	  components;	  (1)	  an	  understanding	  of	  
the	  longstanding	  historical	  context	  of	  the	  development	  of	  law;	  (2)	  an	  analysis	  of	  said	  
historical	  context	  that	  considers	  the	  developments	  of	  the	  economic	  structure	  as	  it	  
correlates	  with	  the	  developments	  of	  law;(3)	  particular	  attention	  should	  be	  allocated	  
to	  the	  role	  of	  ideology	  and	  cultural	  factors,	  which	  contribute	  to	  the	  social	  
construction	  of	  law	  	  in	  conjunction	  with	  economic	  factors	  already	  discussed	  (the	  
sociology	  of	  law	  is	  therefore	  not	  restricted	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  
economy);	  (4)	  an	  inclusion	  of	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  functions	  of	  law.	  When	  discussing	  
the	  	  ‘function’	  of	  law	  however,	  it	  must	  be	  made	  clear	  that	  ‘function’	  is	  distinct	  from	  
‘cause’.	  The	  confusion	  between	  cause	  and	  effect,	  as	  in	  the	  functionalist	  approach	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